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Abstract
We build a new Keynesian DSGE model consisting of two heterogeneous countries in
a monetary union. We study how public debt consolidation in a country with high debt
(like Italy) affects welfare in a country with solid public finances (like Germany). Our
results show that debt consolidation in the high-debt country benefits the country with
solid public finances over all time horizons, while, in Italy, debt consolidation is productive
in the medium and long term. All this is with optimized feedback policy rules. On the
other hand, fiscal consolidation hurts both countries and all the time, if it is implemented
in an ad hoc way, like an increase in taxes. The least distorting fiscal mix from the point
of view of both countries is the one which, during the early phase of pain, Italy cuts public
consumption spending to address its debt problem and, at the same time, reduces income
tax rates, while, once its debt has been reduced in the later phase, it uses the fiscal space
to further cut income taxes.
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1 Introduction
Since the global shock of 2008, several eurozone periphery countries have been in a multiple
crisis. In view of debt sustainability concerns and loss of confidence, these countries have
been forced, among other things, to take restrictive fiscal policy measures which have further
dampened demand in the short term. It is thus not surprising that fiscal consolidation has
been one of the most debated policy areas over the past years. On the other hand, fiscal policy
in eurozone center countries, like Germany, has been neutral. Nevertheless, the debt crisis in
the periphery countries has also affected the German economy, which is another reminder of
the importance of spillovers in an integrated area like the euro area.1
In this paper, we study how public debt consolidation in a country with high debt and
sovereign premia affects welfare in other countries with solid public finances. In particular, we
study how public debt consolidation in a country like Italy affects welfare in a country like
Germany and how these cross-border effects depend on the fiscal policy mix chosen to bring
public debt down.2
The setup is a new Keynesian DSGE model consisting of two heterogeneous countries
forming a currency union. An international asset market allows private agents across countries
to borrow from, or lend to, each other and the same market allows national governments
to sell their bonds to foreign private agents. Regarding macroeconomic policy, being in a
monetary union, there is a single monetary policy. On the other hand, the two countries are
free to follow independent or national fiscal policies. Following most of the literature on debt
consolidation (see below), we follow a rules-based approach to policy. Policy is conducted via
”simple, implementable and optimized” feedback rules (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe,
2007). This means that the union-wide monetary policy is conducted via a standard Taylor
rule for the nominal interest rate, while all the main national fiscal instruments (government
consumption spending, government investment spending, transfer payments, and the tax rates
on labor income, capital income and consumption) can respond to the gap between public
debt and target public debt as shares of output, as well as to the output gap. The values of
feedback (monetary and fiscal) policy coefficients are computed optimally, so as to maximize
a weighted average of households’ expected discounted lifetime utility in the two countries;
1For the debt problem in the euroarea and fiscal policy in various member countries, see e.g. the EEAG
Report on the European Economy (2012, 2017) by CESifo and EMU-Public Finances (2016) by the European
Commission.
2Italy’s (public and foreign) debt position, although sizeable in absolute terms, is not one of the worst in
the euroarea. Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Cyprus, have been in a worse position; see e.g. the EEAG
Report on the European Economy (2012) by CESifo. However, since these countries have received financial aid
from the EC-ECB-IMF, we prefer to use Italy as our euro area periphery country.
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this can be thought of as a cooperative policy at international level. We will experiment with
various public debt policy targets depending on whether national policymakers aim just to
stabilize the economy around its status quo (defined as the solution consistent with the recent
data), or whether they also want to move the economy to a new reformed steady state (defined
as a solution with lower public debt than in the recent data). For comparison, we will also
study exogenous fiscal consolidation scenarios resembing those recently observed in Italy.
We solve the above model numerically employing commonly used parameter values and
fiscal policy data from Germany (called the domestic country) and Italy (called the foreign
country). The steady state solution of this model can mimic relatively well the key features
of the two countries over the euro years and, more importantly, the current account deficits
in Italy financed by current account surpluses in Germany over the period 2001-2011. It is
useful to stress that this is achieved simply by allowing for differences in fiscal policy and the
degree of patience; the latter means that Italians have been less patient than Germans during
the euro period. In turn, we use this solution as a point of departure to study the dynamic
evolution of endogenous variables in response to policy reforms, focusing on debt consolidation
in the high-debt country, namely, Italy.
Our main results are as follows. First, as perhaps expected, had tax-spending policy in Italy
remained unchanged as in the data averages over 2001-2011, the model would be dynamically
unstable. In other words, some type of fiscal reaction (spending cuts and/or tax rises) to public
debt imbalances was necessary for restoring dynamic stability.
Second, debt consolidation in the high-debt country (Italy) benefits the country with solid
public finances (Germany) over all time horizons. By constrast, in Italy, namely the country
that takes the consolidation measures, such a policy is productive only in the medium and long
term. Thus, in Italy, although the benefits outweigh the costs when the criterion is lifetime
utility, debt consolidation comes at a short-term pain relative to non-consolidation. To put it
differently, fiscal consolidation in a high debt country is a common interest over longer horizons
but, in shorter horizons, there seems to be a conflict of national interests. It is interesting to
add that the medium- and long-term benefits from fiscal consolidation become more substantial
for both countries when debt reduction is such that sovereign premia are also eliminated in
the new reformed steady state; but such elimination requires an equalization of time discount
factors, meaning an equal degree of patience, across countries in the new reformed steady state
(see section 2.1 for details). All this holds with optimized feedback policy rules.
Third, the least distorting fiscal policy mix from the point of view of both countries is the
one where, during the early phase of pain, Italy cuts government consumption spending to
3
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address its public debt problem and, at the same time, reduces (labor and capital) income
tax rates to mitigate the short-term recessionary effects of these spending cuts, while, once its
public debt has been reduced in the later phase, it uses the fiscal space created to further cut
capital taxes. In other words, regarding the early phase of pain, Italy’s public debt should be
brought down by cuts in government consumption spending only (and not by cuts in govern-
ment investment and transfer payments or by rises in various taxes), while, regarding the later
phase of fiscal gain, the anticipation of cuts in capital taxes in the future, once debt consoli-
dation has been achieved, plays a key role even in the short term. Use of public consumption
spending is also recommended in Germany, where the policy aim is just cyclical stabilization.
It is also interesting to report that, to the extent that policy reactions are chosen cooperatively,
the higher the say of Germany in policy setting, the stronger the fiscal consolidation in Italy
should be during the early period of pain. Again, all this holds with optimized feedback policy
rules.
The fourth result is about exogenous data-mimicking policies, so it is a positive result.
The implications of such policies are very different from the normative implications listed
above. In particular, we experiment with an exogenous scenario of debt consolidation that
resembles the policy actually implemented between 2012 and 2015; this means that, in Italy,
the tax revenue to GDP ratio rises by around two percentage points, while the spending ratio
remains practically unchanged, and, in Germany, fiscal policy is kept neutral. In this case,
debt consolidation in Italy is harmful for both countries and across all time horizons, always
relative to non-consolidation. Therefore, the way public debt is brought down is important.
Finally, the above results are robust to a number of extensions, namely, the introduction
of non-Ricardian households, shocks to starting public debt, changes in the value of the pub-
lic debt policy target, or flexible exchange rates. The policy recipes are also robust to the
degree of international cooperation in policy decision-making. However, in a non-cooperative
(Nash) policy regime, the absence of cooperation leads to a relatively small degree of fiscal
consolidation in Italy; the idea is that countries free ride on other countries’ debt stabilization
efforts.
The literature closest to our work is the one on debt consolidation in multi-country open
economy models and especially in currency union models; see e.g. Coenen et al. (2008), Forni
et al. (2010), Clinton et al. (2011), Erceg and Linde´ (2013) and Cogan et al. (2013). These
papers have compared different ad hoc fiscal consolidation scenarios in a currency union. Here,
by contrast, we compute optimized feedback policy rules for a rich menu of fiscal instruments
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allowed to be used simultaneously;3 hence, we do not have to make any arbitrary assump-
tions about which instrument to use to react to economic conditions and/or how strong this
reaction is (the latter also determines the optimal speed of fiscal consolidation).4 We also
compare optimal to exogenous data-mimicking policy in light of the European debt crisis and
thus emphasize the importance of the policy mix adopted. In addition, in what concerns the
framework we work within, as far as we know, there have been no previous attempts to search
for the best possible use of all main fiscal policy instruments in a new Keynesian DSGE model
of a currency union consisting of two heterogeneous countries and, then, study the cross-border
implications of fiscal consolidation measures taken by a high-debt country. Country hetero-
geneity takes the form of weak public finances and external debt in one country (e.g. Italy)
and sound public finances and external assets in the other country (e.g. Germany) and this
is reflected in sovereign premia. This type of heterogeneity is at the heart of the current de-
bate in Europe and hence allows for a more realistic assessment of alternative consolidation
policies. Finally, we also address how the political power of each country affects the chosen
consolidation policies in a cooperative international setup, as well as the implications of the
lack of such cooperation.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The status quo
solution is in section 3. Section 4 explains our policy experiments. The main results are in
sections 5 and 6. Section 7 studies other policy regimes. Section 8 closes the paper. An online
appendix provides algebraic details and extra results.
3Papers that also compute optimized feedback policy rules in various economic environments include Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2005 and 2007), Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Kollmann (2008), Cantore et al. (2017) and
Philippopoulos et al. (2015, 2016). Differences from these papers are discussed right below, while alternative
approaches to policy decision-making are discussed in the last section (section 8).
4As is widely recognized (see e.g. Coenen et al., 2012, and D’ Erasmo et al., 2016), the assumed size of
feedback policy coefficients is an important factor behind the variation of results across models.
5Papers on debt consolidation in closed economy or small open economy models include Bi et al. (2013),
Corsetti et al. (2013), Almeida et al. (2013), Benigno and Romei (2014), Benigno et al. (2014), Cantore et
al. (2017) and Philippopoulos et al. (2015, 2016). Cantore et al. (2017) also study optimized simple rules, as
we do here, but this is in a closed economy model, while Philippopoulos et al. (2016) focus on a small open
economy. Beetsma and Jensen (2005) and Okano (2014) do compute optimal policies in a currency union but
do not study debt consolidation. The literature on debt consolidation has built on the earlier literature on the
fiscal-monetary policy interaction; see e.g. Leeper (1991), Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2005 and 2007), Beetsma
and Jensen (2005), Kollmann (2008), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2008), Batini et al. (2009), Leeper et al. (2009),
Kirsanova et al. (2009), Bi and Kumhof (2011) and Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2012).
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2 A two-country model of a monetary union
This section presents a New Keynesian DSGE model of a currency union consisting of two
heterogeneous countries.6
2.1 Informal description of the model
In each country, there are households, firms and a national fiscal authority. In a monetary
union, there is a single monetary authority. Households in each country save in the form of
physical capital, domestic government bonds and internationally traded assets. The market for
internationally traded assets allows private agents across countries to borrow from, or lend to,
each other and it also allows national governments to sell their bonds to foreign private agents.7
International borrowing/lending takes place through a financial intermediary or bank and this
intermediation requires a transaction cost proportional to the amount of the nation’s debt.8
This cost creates a wedge between the borrowing and the lending interest rate, so that, when
they participate in the international asset market, agents (private and public) of the debtor
country face a higher interest rate than agents (private and public) of the creditor country.9 To
the extent that the bank makes a profit, this profit is rebated lump-sum to households located
in the creditor country.
Systematic borrowing and lending cannot occur in an homogeneous world. Some type of
heterogeneity is needed. A popular way of producing borrowers and lenders has been to assume
that agents differ in their patience to consume; specifically, the discount factor of lenders is
higher than that of borrowers or, equivalently, borrowers are more impatient than lenders.10
Such differences in discount factors need to be combined with an imperfection in the capital
market in order to get a well-defined solution;11 in our model, the capital market imperfection
is the transaction cost of the loan. Therefore, the international transaction cost ensures, not
only stationarity of foreign asset positions as is typically the case in the literature (see e.g.
6The model is similar to that in Economides et al (2016). However, here we study optimal debt consolidation
policies within a currency union, while that paper compared a currency union to other regimes like a fiscal
(transfer) union and without optimal policy.
7See also Forni et al. (2010), Cogan et al. (2013), Erceg and Linde´ (2013) and many others.
8Thus, as in e.g. Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010, 2011) and Benigno et al (2014), we use the device of a financial
intermediary. We could instead assume transaction costs incurred upon borrowers; see e.g. Forni et al. (2010),
Cogan et al. (2013), Erceg and Linde´ ( 2013).
9That is, here, differences in interest rates across countries are produced by transcation costs incurred by
the bank. As is known such differences can be produced in various other ways (see subsection 2.5 below).
10See also e.g. Benigno et al. (2014). Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) also use a general equilibrium model with
two types of agents, creditors and borrowers, who discount the future differently. Note that we could further
enrich our model so as the discount factors are formed endogenously.
11See also e.g. Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) and Benigno et al. (2014).
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Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2003), but also allows for a well-defined solution with different
discount factors across different countries.
The solution of this model will imply that one country (Germany) is a net lender and the
other (Italy) is a net borrower in the international asset market and that interest rates are
higher in the net debtor country. That is, as said in the Introduction, the relatively impatient
Italians finance their current account deficits by borrowing funds from the patient Germans
who run current account surpluses. This scenario is also consistent with the literature on the
interpretation of current accounts, in the sense that systematic low saving rates and current
account deficits are believed to reflect relatively low patience (see e.g. Choi et al., 2008).
On other dimensions, the model is a standard new Keynesian currency union model.12 In
particular, each country produces an array of differentiated goods and, in both countries, firms
act monopolistically facing Calvo-type nominal fixities. Nominal fixities can give a real role
to monetary and exchange rate policy, at least in the transition path. In a monetary union,
we assume a single monetary policy but independent national fiscal policies. Policy (both
monetary and fiscal) is conducted by optimized state-contingent policy rules.
The rest of this section models the above story. We will present the domestic country. The
structure of the foreign country will be analogous except otherwise said. A star will denote
the counterpart of a variable in the foreign country.
2.2 Households
This subsection presents the problem of households in the domestic country. There are N
identical households indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., N . Similarly, in the foreign economy. For simplicity,
population in both countries, N and N∗, is constant over time and the two countries are of
equal size, N = N∗.
2.2.1 Consumption bundles
The quantity of each variety h produced at home by domestic firm h and consumed by each
domestic household i is denoted as cHi,t(h). Using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, the composite
of domestic goods consumed by each domestic household i, cHi,t, consists of h varieties and is
given by:13
cHi,t =
[
N∑
h=1
[cHi,t(h)]
φ−1
φ
] φ
φ−1
(1)
12See Okano (2014) for a review of the related literature dating back to Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005, 2008).
13As in e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we work with summations rather than with integrals.
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where φ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across goods produced in the domestic country.
Similarly, the quantity of each imported variety f produced abroad by foreign firm f and
consumed by each domestic household i is denoted as cFi,t(f). Using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator,
the composite of imported goods consumed by each domestic household i, cFi,t, consists of f
varieties and is given by:
cFi,t =
[
N∑
f=1
[cFi,t(f)]
φ−1
φ
] φ
φ−1
(2)
In turn, having defined cHi,t and c
F
i,t, i’s consumption bundle, ci,t, is defined as:
ci,t =
(
cHi,t
)ν (
cFi,t
)1−ν
νν(1− ν)1−ν (3)
where ν is the degree of preference for domestic goods (if ν > 1/2, there is a home bias).
2.2.2 Consumption expenditure, prices and terms of trade
Domestic household i’s total consumption expenditure is:
Ptci,t = P
H
t c
H
i,t + P
F
t c
F
i,t (4)
where Pt is the consumer price index (CPI), P
H
t is the price index of home tradables, and P
F
t
is the price index of foreign tradables (expressed in domestic currency).
Each domestic household’s total expenditure on home goods and foreign goods are:
PHt c
H
i,t =
N∑
h=1
PHt (h)c
H
i,t(h) (5)
PFt c
F
i,t =
N∑
f=1
PFt (f)c
F
i,t(f) (6)
where PHt (h) is the price of each variety h produced at home and P
F
t (f) is the price of each
variety f produced abroad, both denominated in domestic currency.
We assume that the law of one price holds meaning that each tradable good sells at the
same price at home and abroad. Thus, PFt (f) = StP
H∗
t (f), where St is the nominal exchange
rate (where an increase in St implies a depreciation) and P
H∗
t (f) is the price of variety f
produced abroad denominated in foreign currency. Note that the terms of trade are defined
as
PFt
PHt
(=
StPH∗t
PHt
), while the real exchange rate is defined as
StP ∗t
Pt
. In a currency union, we set
St ≡ 1 at all t.
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2.2.3 Household’s optimization problem
Each household i acts competitively to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility, V0:
V0 ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (ci,t, ni,t,mi,t, gt) (7)
where ci,t is i’s consumption bundle as defined above, ni,t is i’s hours of work, mi,t is i’s real
money holdings, gt is per capita utility-enhancing public goods and services provided by the
government, 0 < β < 1 is domestic agents’ discount factor, and E0 is a rational expectations
operator.
For our numerical solutions, the period utility function will be (see also e.g. Gal´ı, 2008):
ui,t (ci,t, ni,t,mi,t, gt) =
c1−σi,t
1− σ − χn
n1+ϕi,t
1 + ϕ
+ χm
m1−µi,t
1− µ + χg
g1−ζt
1− ζ (8)
where χn, χm, χg, σ, ϕ, µ, ζ are standard preference parameters, 1/σ is the elasticity of
substitution between consumption at two points in time and 1/ϕ is the Frisch labour elasticity.
The period budget constraint of each household i in the domestic country written in real
terms (i.e. nominal variables are divided by the domestic CPI, Pt) is:
(1 + τ ct)
[
PHt
Pt
cHi,t +
PFt
Pt
cFi,t
]
+
PHt
Pt
xi,t + bi,t +mi,t +
StP ∗t
Pt
fhi,t =
=
(
1− τkt
) [
rkt
PHt
Pt
ki,t−1 + ω˜i,t
]
+ (1− τnt )wtni,t +Rt−1 Pt−1Pt bi,t−1+
+Pt−1Pt mi,t−1 +Qt−1
StP ∗t
Pt
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
fhi,t−1 − τ li,t + pii,t
(9)
where xi,t is i’s investment in domestic physical capital, bi,t is the real value of i’s end-of-period
domestic government bonds, mi,t is i’s end-of period real domestic money holdings, f
h
i,t is the
real value of i’s end-of-period internationally traded assets denominated in foreign currency (if
fhi,t < 0, it denotes private foreign debt), r
k
t is the real return to ki,t−1 which is i’s beginning-
of-period domestic physical capital, ω˜i,t denotes i’s real dividends received by domestic firms,
wt is the real wage rate, Rt−1 ≥ 1 denotes the gross nominal return to domestic government
bonds between t− 1 and t, Qt−1 ≥ 1 denotes the gross nominal return to international assets
between t− 1 and t, τ li,t is real taxes/transfers (if positive, it denotes lump-sum taxes paid to
the government; if negative, it denotes transfers received by the government), pii,t is real profits
distributed in a lump-sum fashion to each domestic household by the financial intermediary
and 0 ≤ τ ct , τkt , τnt < 1 are tax rates on consumption, capital income and labour income
respectively.
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The law of motion of i’s physical capital is:
ki,t = (1− δ)ki,t−1 + xi,t − ξ
2
(
ki,t
ki,t−1
− 1
)2
ki,t−1 (10)
where 0 < δ < 1 is a depreciation rate and ξ ≥ 0 is a parameter capturing adjustment costs.
Details on the household’s problem, its first-order conditions and implications for the price
bundles are in Appendix 1.
2.3 Firms
This subsection presents the problem of firms in the domestic economy. There are N domestic
firms indexed by h = 1, 2, ..., N . Each firm h produces a differentiated tradable good of variety
h under monopolistic competition and Calvo-type nominal fixities.
2.3.1 Demand for the firm’s product
Demand for each product h, denoted as yHt (h), is (see Appendix 2 for details):
yHt (h) =
[
PHt (h)
PHt
]−φ
Y Ht (11)
where Y Ht denotes total demand in the domestic country.
2.3.2 Firm’s optimization problem
Real profits of each domestic firm h are defined as:
ω˜t(h) ≡ P
H
t (h)
Pt
yHt (h)−
PHt
Pt
rkt kt−1(h)− wtnt(h) (12)
where kt−1(h) and nt(h) denote capital and labor inputs chosen by firm h at t.
Maximization is subject to the demand function, (11), and the production function:
yHt (h) = At[kt−1(h)]
α[nt(h)]
1−α (13)
where At is total factor productivity (TFP), whose motion is defined below, and 0 < α < 1 is
a technology parameter.
In each period, each firm h faces an exogenous probability θ of not being able to reset its
price. A firm h, which is able to reset its price at time t, chooses its price P#t (h) to maximize
the sum of discounted expected nominal profits for the next k periods in which it may have to
keep its price fixed.
10
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Details on the firm’s problem and its first-order conditions are in Appendix 2.
2.4 Government budget constraint
The period budget constraint of the consolidated government sector in the domestic country
expressed in real and per capita terms is (see Appendix 3 for details):
bt +
StP ∗t
Pt
fgt +mt = Rt−1
Pt−1
Pt
bt−1 +Qt−1
StP ∗t
Pt
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
fgt−1 +
Pt−1
Pt
mt−1+
+
PHt
Pt
gt − τ ct(P
H
t
Pt
cHt +
PFt
Pt
cFt )− τkt (rkt P
H
t
Pt
kt−1 + ω˜t)− τnt wtnt − τ lt
(14)
where bt is the end-of-period domestic real public debt held by domestic households, f
g
t is the
end-of-period domestic real public debt held by foreign households and expressed in foreign
prices,14 and mt is the end-of-period stock of real money balances. Also, gt, c
H
t , c
F
t , kt−1, ω˜t, nt
are respectively government purchases of goods and services, households’ consumption of the
domestic good, households’ consumption of the imported good, households’ physical capital
holdings, households’ dividends and household’s work hours. Finally, τ ct , τ
k
t , τ
n
t and τ
l
t have
been defined above.
Equivalently, if we define total nominal public debt in the domestic country as Dt ≡
Bt + StF
g
t , so that in real and per capita terms dt ≡ bt + StP
∗
t
Pt
fgt , we have bt ≡ λtdt and
StP ∗t
Pt
fgt ≡ (1 − λt)dt, where 0 ≤ λt ≤ 1 denotes the fraction of domestic public debt held by
domestic private agents and 0 ≤ 1 − λt ≤ 1 is the fraction of domestic public debt held by
foreign private agents.
In each period, one of the fiscal instruments (τ ct , τ
k
t , τ
n
t , gt, τ
l
t, λt, dt) follows residually to
satisfy the government budget constraint. We assume, except otherwise said, that this role is
played by the end-of-period total public debt, dt.
15
14Since the returns to bonds held by domestic agents and the same bonds held by foreign agents can differ,
our modelling assumes implicitly that the bond market can be segmented.
15We treat the share of public debt held by foreign private agents, (1− λt), as an exogenous variable. In our
model, there is a single international asset subject to a single transaction cost. Thus, since we do not allow
for separate international asset markets (one for private and one for public), we need an extra assumption to
get a solution and this is provided by treating λt as an exogenous variable in each country (it will be set as
in the data average). Alternatively, we could assume that private agents in each country can separately invest
in foreign private assets and foreign government bonds (rather than in a single international asset). But, as is
known, this modelling would lead to a non-well specified system (a kind of portfolio indeterminacy), except if
one is willing to assume different transaction costs in different asset markets. In the latter case, portfolio shares
could be determined but their solution would depend on the parameterization of the associated transaction cost
function. This would not be different from treating λt exogenously in the first place.
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2.5 World financial intermediary
We use a simple and popular model of financial frictions (see e.g. Uribe and Yue, 2006, Cu´rdia
and Woodford, 2010 and 2011, and Benigno et al., 2014). International borrowing, or lending,
takes place through a financial intermediary or bank. This intermediary is located in the home
country. It plays a traditional role only, collecting deposits from lenders and lending the funds
to borrowers.
In particular, the bank raises funds from domestic private agents,
(
fht − fgt
)
, at the rate
Qt and lends to foreign agents, (f
∗g
t − f∗ht ), at the rate Q∗t .16 In addition, the bank faces
operational costs, which are increasing and convex in the volume of the loan, (f∗gt − f∗ht ). The
profit of the bank is revenue minus cost where revenue is net of transaction costs. Thus, the
profit written in real and per capita terms in the domestic country is given by (details are in
Appendix 4):
pit = Q
∗
t−1
[
Pt−1
Pt
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)−
PHt
Pt
PHt−1
PHt
ψ
2
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)2
]
−Qt−1StP
∗
t
Pt
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
(
fht−1 − fgt−1
)
(15)
where ψ2 (f
∗g
t−1 − f∗ht−1)2 is a real and per capita cost function and ψ ≥ 0 is a parameter (see
subsection 3.1 below for its value). The first term in the brackets on the RHS is the bank’s
return on the loan net of transaction costs, while the last term is payments to the savers.
At each t, the bank chooses the volume of its loan takingQt andQ
∗
t as given. The optimality
condition is (details are in Appendix 4):
Q∗t−1 =
Qt−1 StSt−1
1− P
H
t−1
Pt−1ψ(f
∗g
t−1 − f∗ht−1)
(16)
where, in a currency union, St ≡ 1; thus, Q∗t > Qt which means that borrowers pay a sovereign
premium.
It needs to be said that the implied property in equation (16) - namely, that the interest
rate, at which the country borrows from the rest of the world, is increasing in the nation’s total
foreign debt - is supported by a number of empirical studies (see e.g. EMU-Public Finances,
16Here fht ≡
∑N
i=1 f
h
i,t
N
, where fhi,t ≡ F
h
i,t
P∗t
is each household i’s foreign assets denominated in foreign currency,
and fgt ≡ F
g
t
P∗t N
is real and per capita public foreign debt (i.e. public debt held by foreign agents) in the domestic
country; similarly in the foreign country. Then, if it so happens that
(
fht − fgt
)
is positive, it denotes net foreign
assets in the home country and if it so happens that (f∗gt − f∗ht ) is positive, it denotes net foreign liabilities in
the foreign country. In equilibrium, (f∗gt − f∗ht ) + StP
∗
t
Pt
(fgt − fht ) = 0. Appendix 4 provides details.
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2012, by the European Commission). It should also be said that a similar type of endogeneity
of the country premium can be produced by several other models, including models of default
risk.17
2.6 Monetary and fiscal policy
We now specify monetary and fiscal policy rules.
2.6.1 Single monetary policy rule in a monetary union
If we had flexible exchange rates, the exchange rate would be an endogenous variable and the
two countries’ nominal interest rates, Rt and R
∗
t , could be free to be set independently by
the national monetary authorities, say, to follow national Taylor-type rules (see section 7 for
flexible exchange rates). Here, by contrast, to mimic the eurozone regime, we assume that
only one of the nominal interest rates, say Rt, can follow a Taylor-type rule, while R
∗
t is an
endogenous variable replacing the exchange rate which becomes an exogenous policy variable
(this modelling, where the union’s central bank uses one of national governments’ interest rates
as its policy instrument, is similar to that in e.g. Gal´ı and Monacelli, 2008, and Benigno and
Benigno, 2008).18
In particular, we assume a single monetary feedback policy rule of the form:
log
(
Rt
R
)
= φpi
(
η log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ (1− η) log
(
Π∗t
Π∗
))
+
+φy
(
η log
(
yHt
yH
)
+ (1− η) log
(
y∗Ht
y∗H
))
(17)
where φpi ≥ 0 and φy ≥ 0 are respectively feedback monetary policy coefficients on price
inflation and the output gap, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 is the political weight given to the domestic country
relative to the foreign country (see subsection 3.1 below for the value of this parameter) and
variables without time subscripts denote policy targets (in the case of monetary policy, the
policy targets are simply the steady state values of the corresponding variables).
17Default risk reflects the fear of de jure, or outright, repudiation of debt obligations, but also the fear of de
facto default via inflation or new wealth taxes with retroactive effect (see Alesina et al., 1992, for an early study
and D’ Erasmo et al., 2016, for a recent study). As Corsetti et al. (2013) point out, there are two modelling
approaches to sovereign default. The first approach models it as a strategic choice of the government (see e.g.
Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981, Arellano, 2008, D’ Erasmo et al., 2016, and many others). The second approach
assumes that default occurs when debt exceeds an endogenous fiscal limit (see e.g. Bi, 2012, and many others).
In our paper, we abstract from issues related to default.
18For various ways of modelling monetary policy in a monetary union, see e.g. Dellas and Tavlas (2005) and
Collard and Dellas (2006).
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2.6.2 National fiscal policy rules
Countries can follow independent fiscal policies. As in the case of monetary policy above, we
focus on simple feedback rules meaning that national fiscal authorities react to a small number
of easily observable macroeconomic indicators. In particular, in each country, we allow all the
main spending-tax policy instruments, namely, the ratio of real government spending on goods
and services to real GDP, defined as sgt , the ratio of real government transfers to real GDP,
denoted as slt, and the tax rates on consumption, capital income and labor income, τ
c
t , τ
k
t and
τnt , to react to the public debt-to-GDP ratio as deviation from a target value, as well as to the
output gap, according to simple linear rules:19
sgt − sg = −γgl (lt−1 − l)− γgy
(
yHt − yH
)
(18)
slt − sl = γll (lt−1 − l) + γly
(
yHt − yH
)
(19)
τ ct − τ c = γcl (lt−1 − l) + γcy
(
yHt − yH
)
(20)
τkt − τk = γkl (lt−1 − l) + γky
(
yHt − yH
)
(21)
τnt − τn = γnl (lt−1 − l) + γny
(
yHt − yH
)
(22)
where lt−1 is the beginning-of-period government liabilities as share of GDP (defined right
below), γql and γ
q
y ≥ 0, for q ≡ (g, l, c, k, n), are respectively feedback fiscal policy coefficients
on public liabilities and the output gap, and variables without time subscripts denote policy
targets (see subsection 4.1 below for definition of fiscal policy targets). It should be recalled
that a negative value of slt denotes transfers, so a positive γ
l
l means that transfers fall when
public liabilities rise above their target.
From the government budget constraint, public liabilities at the end of period t expressed
in real and per capita terms are (see Appendix 3 for details):
19For similar rules, see e.g Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) and Cantore et al. (2017). See also EMU-Public
Finances (2011) by the European Commission and D’ Erasmo et al. (2016) for fiscal reaction functions used in
practice and their role in public debt sustainability.
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lt ≡
Rtλtdt +Qt
St+1
St
(1− λt) dt
PHt
Pt
yHt
(23)
Fiscal policy in the foreign country is modelled similarly.
2.7 Exogenous variables and shocks
We now specify the rest of the exogenous variables, At, A
∗
t , λt, λ
∗
t and
St+1
St
. Starting with
TFP in the two countries, At and A
∗
t , we assume stochastic AR(1) processes of the form:
log (At) = (1− ρa) log (A) + ρa log (At−1) + εαt (24)
log (A∗t ) = (1− ρ∗a) log (A∗) + ρ∗a log
(
A∗t−1
)
+ ε∗αt (25)
where 0 < ρa, ρ∗a < 1 are persistence parameters, variables without time subscript denote
steady state values and εat ∼ N
(
0, σ2a
)
, ε∗at ∼ N
(
0, σ∗2a
)
.
The fiscal policy variables, {λt, λ∗t }∞t=0, are assumed to be constant and equal to their data
average values in all t. Finally, as said, in a regime of a currency union, we set St ≡ 1 in all t.
In other words, we assume that stochasticity comes from shocks to TFP only (we report
however that our main results do not depend on this).
2.8 Equilibrium system in the status quo economy
We now combine the above to get the equilibrium system for any feasible policy. This is defined
to be a sequence of allocations, prices and policies such that: (i) households maximize utility;
(ii) a fraction (1− θ) of firms maximize profits by choosing an identical price P#t , while a
fraction θ just set prices at their previous period level; (iii) the international bank maximizes
its profit (iv) all constraints, including the government budget constraint and the balance of
payments, are satisfied; (v) all markets clear, including the international asset market; (vi)
policy instruments are set by feedback rules.
This equilibrium system is presented in detail in Appendix 5. It consists of 61 equations in
61 variables, {Vt, yHt ,ct, cHt , cFt , nt, xt, kt, fht , mt, TTt, Πt, ΠHt , Θt, ∆t, wt, mct, ω˜t, rkt , dt, Π∗t ,
z1t , z
2
t , pit, qt, Qt, lt, V
∗
t , y
∗H
t , c
∗
t , c
H∗
t , c
F∗
t , n
∗
t , x
∗
t , k
∗
t , f
h∗
t , m
∗
t , Π
H∗
t , Θ
∗
t , ∆
∗
t , w
∗
t , mc
∗
t , ω˜
∗,
r∗kt , d∗t , z1∗t , z2∗t , Q∗t , l∗t , Rt, s
g
t , s
l
t, τ
c
t , τ
k
t , τ
n
t , R
∗
t , s
g∗
t , s
l∗
t , τ
c∗
t , τ
k∗
t , τ
n∗
t }∞t=0. This is for given
the exogenous variables, {At, A∗t , λt, λ∗t , St}∞t=0, as defined in subsection 2.7, the values of
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feedback policy coefficients as defined in subsection 2.6 (these values will be chosen optimally)
and initial conditions for the state variables.
2.9 Plan of the rest of the paper
Our main goal in this paper is to evaluate the implications of various hypothetical and actual
debt consolidation policies. We will therefore work as follows. First, using commonly employed
parameter values and fiscal data from Germany and Italy, we will numerically solve the above
model. This is in the next section (section 3). In turn, to the extent that the steady state
solution of this model is empirically relevant (meaning that it can mimic the data averages
over the euro area period of study), we will use this solution - defined as the status quo - as a
point of departure in order to evaluate the implications of various debt consolidation policies.
A description of policy experiments and a discussion of the solution methodology are in section
4, while numerical solutions are in sections 5, 6 and 7.
3 Data, parameteres and solution of the status quo model
This section solves numerically the above model by using annual data from Germany and Italy
over the period 2001-2011. We start in 2001 because this year marked the introduction of the
euro and we stop at 2011 because the year 2012 marked the beginning of fiscal consolidation
efforts in Italy (see e.g. EMU-Public Finances, 2015, by the European Commission).
3.1 Parameter values and fiscal policy variables
The baseline parameter values and the data averages of fiscal policy variables, used in the
numerical solution of the above model, are listed in Tables 1a and 1b respectively. The time
unit is meant to be a year. The two countries can differ only in their discount factors (see β
and β∗ in Table 1a) and fiscal policy variables (see the fiscal policy instruments in Table 1b).
In all other respects, the two countries are assumed to be symmetric. Interestingly, as said
above, these two differences will prove to be enough to give a steady state solution close to the
data averages during 2001-2011.
Regarding parameter values, the model’s key parameters are the discount factors in the
two countries, β and β∗, and the cost coefficient driving the wedge between the borrowing and
the lending interest rate, ψ. The values of these parameters are calibrated to match the real
interest rates and the net foreign asset position of the two countries in the time period under
consideration. In particular, the values of β and β∗ follow from the Euler equations in the two
16
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countries which, at the steady state, are reduced to:
βQ/Π = 1 (26)
β∗Q∗/Π∗ = 1 (27)
where Q/Π and Q∗/Π∗ are gross real interest rates in the two countries (see Appendix 5 for
detailed definitions of all variables). Since Q/Π < Q∗/Π∗ in the data over the period under
consideration, it follows β = 0.9833 > β∗ = 0.9780. That is, the Germans are more patient
than the Italians.
In turn, the optimality condition of the bank, (16), written at the steady state, is:
Q∗ =
Q
1− PHP ψ(f∗g − f∗h)
(28)
from which the value of the parameter ψ is calibrated.
All other parameter values, as listed in Table 1a, are the same across countries and are
set at values commonly used in related studies. We start by setting the value of the political
weight, η, at the ”neutral” value of 0.5 (a sensitivity analysis regarding this parameter is in
section 6 below). We report that our main results are robust to changes in these values (see
section 6 below for further details). Thus, although our numerical simulations below are not
meant to provide a rigorous quantitative study, they illustrate the qualitative dynamic features
of the model in a realistic way.
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Table 1a: Baseline parameter values
Parameter Home Foreign Description
a, a∗ 0.3 0.3 share of physical capital in production
ν, ν∗ 0.5 0.5 home goods bias in consumption
µ, µ∗ 3.42 3.42 money demand elasticity in utility
δ, δ∗ 0.1 0.1 capital depreciation rate
φ, φ∗ 6 6 price elasticity of demand
ϕ,ϕ∗ 1 1 inverse of Frisch labour elasticity
σ, σ∗ 1 1 inverse of elasticity of substitution in consumption
θ, θ∗ 0.2 0.2 price rigidity parameter
χm, χ
∗
m 0.001 0.001 preference parameter related to money balances
χn, χ
∗
n 5 5 preference parameter related to work effort
χg, χ
∗
g 0.1 0.1 preference parameter related to public spending
ξ, ξ∗ 0.01 0.01 adjustment cost parameter of physical capital
ζ, ζ∗ 1 1 public spending elasticity in utility
η 0.5 0.5 political weight in union-wide policies
β, β∗ 0.9833 0.9780 time discount factor
ψ 0.072 - cost parameter in international borrowing
σα, σα∗ 0.01 0.01 standard deviation of TFP
ρα, ρα
∗
0.92 0.92 persistence of TFP
Regarding fiscal policy variables in the two countries as defined in subsection 2.6.2 above,
the steady state government spending-to-GDP ratios and tax rates are set to their average
values in the data in Germany and Italy over 2001-2011 (see Table 1b). In particular, as a
measure of sg and s∗g, which serve as arguments in households’ utility function and hence
are typically thought of as public consumption, we use data on total government spending on
goods and services,20 while, we use data on transfer payments as a measure of sl and s∗l, which
enter households’ budget constraints. As tax rates, τ c, τ∗c, τk, τ∗k, τn and τ∗n, we use the
associated effective tax rates (or what Eurostat calls implicit tax rates).
20We could use data on government consumption spending only to measure sg and s∗g; this is not important
to our results. In subsection 6.4 below, we will augment the model by giving different roles to government
consumption and government investment spending.
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Table 1b: Fiscal policy variables (2001-2011 data averages)
Variable Home Foreign Description
τ c, τ∗c 0.1934 0.1756 consumption tax rate
τk, τ∗k 0.2041 0.3118 capital income tax rate
τn, τ∗n 0.3833 0.421 labour income tax rate
sg, s∗g 0.2131 0.2423 government purchases of goods/services as share of GDP
sl, s∗l -0.2039 -0.2163 government transfers payments as share of GDP
λ, λ∗ 0.52 0.61 share of public debt held by domestic agents
Note: The data source is Eurostat.
3.2 Steady state solution in the status quo model
The equilibrium system was defined in subsection 2.8 and the associated steady state follows
simply if we assume that variables do not change over time (details are at the end of Appendix
5). Table 2 presents the steady state solution when parameters and policy instruments are
set at the values in Tables 1a-b. It is worth pointing out that, since policy instruments react
to deviations of macroeconomic indicators from their steady state values, feedback policy
coefficients do not play any role in steady state solutions. In this steady state solution, the
residually determined public financing variable is public debt in both countries. Table 2 also
presents some key ratios in the German and Italian data and, as can be seen, the respective
ratios implied by the steady state solution are close to their values in the data. In particular,
the solution can mimic rather well the data averages of public debt-to-GDP ratios and foreign
debt-to-GDP ratios in the two countries over 2001-2011.
This steady state solution will serve as a point of departure. That is, in what follows, we
will depart from this solution to study the implications of various policy experiments. We
report (and this is confirmed below) that an exogenous reduction in public debt stimulates
output and improves welfare in both countries; this can provide a first justification for our
fiscal consolidation experiments.
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Table 2: Status quo steady state solution
Variables Description Home Data Foreign Data
u, u∗ utility 0.0376 - 0.0315 -
yH , yH∗ output 0.3912 - 0.3543 -
c, c∗ consumption 0.2314 - 0.2278 -
n, n∗ hours worked 0.3116 - 0.3063 -
k, k∗ capital 0.6655 - 0.4976 -
w, w∗ real wage rate 0.6976 - 0.7085 -
rk, rk∗ real return to capital 0.1470 - 0.1780 -
Q∗−Q interest rate premium - - 0.0055 0.0055
c
yHTT 1−ν ,
c∗
yH∗TT ν
∗−1
t
consumption as
share of GDP
0.5633 - 0.6752 -
k
yH
, k
∗
yH∗ capital as share of GDP 1.7009 - 1.4045 -
d
TT ν−1yH ,
d∗
TT 1−ν∗y∗H
total public debt
as share of GDP
0.6907 0.6861 1.0871 1.08
(
(1−λ)d
TTν−1−TT
ν∗
t f
h
)
yH
,
(1−λ∗)d∗
TT1−ν−ν∗ −f
∗h
TT νt y
∗H
total foreign debt
as share of GDP*
-0.2109 -0.2501 0.2114 0.2109
Notes: Parameters and policy variables as in Tables 1a-b.
3.3 Transition dynamics and determinacy
It is well recognized that the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy, and, in particular,
the magnitude of the associated feedback policy coefficients in the policy rules, are crucial to
determinacy (see e.g. Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2008). This is also the case in our paper.
In particular, when we assume that fiscal policy instruments remain constant at their data
average values in Table 1b without any reaction to public debt and there is no interest rate
policy reaction to inflation, the model, when approximated around the status quo steady state
solution, exhibits dynamic instability meaning that there is no convergence to the steady state
solution reported above. In other words, policy can guarantee a unique transition path, only
when at least one fiscal policy instrument in each country (sgt , s
l
t, τ
c
t , τ
k
t , τ
n
t and s
g∗
t , s
l∗
t , τ
c∗
t ,
τk∗t , τn∗t ) reacts to public liabilities. The magnitude of these reactions lies within a range of
critical minimum and maximum non-zero values. These critical values differ across different
fiscal policy instruments. And all this holds when monetary policy satisfies the so-called Taylor
principle, meaning that the single nominal interest rate reacts aggressively to inflation. This
will also be confirmed by the results for optimized policy rules below. By contrast, fiscal and
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monetary policy reaction to the output gap has not been found to be crucial for determinacy.
Further details regarding ranges of feedback policy coefficients guaranteeing local determinacy
are available upon request. In sum, determinacy requires stabilizing fiscal reaction to inherited
public debt and monetary reaction to inflation; this holds in all cases studied below.
4 Description of policy experiments and solution strategy
This section defines our policy experiments and explains the solution strategy. Numerical
results will then be presented in sections 5, 6 and 7. In our main thought experiment, we
will depart from the status quo steady state solution (in other words, the initial values of
the predetermined variables will be those found by the steady state solution in Table 2) and
compute the equilibrium transition path as we travel towards a new reformed steady state (the
key policy reforms are defined in subsection 4.1). Additional policy scenarios, used mainly for
comparison, are defined in subsection 4.2. The values of feedback coefficients of monetary and
fiscal policy instruments used in the transition from the status quo steady state to a new steady
state will be chosen optimally (this is explained in subsection 4.3). Transition dynamics will
be driven by extrinsic TFP shocks in both countries and by policy reforms in the high-debt
country, except otherwise said.21
4.1 National fiscal policies and reforms in the main policy experiment
In our main thought experiment, motivated by the facts discussed in the opening paragraph
of the Introduction, we focus on two different types of fiscal action, one for each country.
4.1.1 Fiscal policy scenario in the domestic country with solid public finances
The domestic country (defined to be Germany) is assumed to follow a neutral fiscal policy. In
other words, we assume that the domestic country does not take any active fiscal consolidation
measures but it just stabilizes the public debt-to-GDP ratio at its average level, where the
latter, namely the public debt target in the country’s feedback policy rules, is defined to be
the steady state value of the public debt-to-GDP ratio as determined residually by the within-
period government budget constraint. That is, in this country, we depart from, and end up
at, the same tax-spending position, which is as in the average data in Germany (however, as
explained below, the new steady state solution will differ from the status quo solution because
21We have also experimented with asymmetric shocks (for instance, shocks in one country only), or no shocks
at all, and the main results do not change. Thus, our main results will be driven by policy (debt consolidation)
reforms in the high-debt country.
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of fiscal consolidation in the foreign country). This is usually called ”debt accommodation” in
the related literature (see Wren-Lewis, 2010).
Specifically, fiscal policy in the domestic country is defined as follows: (a) All exogenously
set tax-spending national policy instruments remain at the same value (data average value) in
both the status quo steady state and the new steady state. (b) Along the transition to the new
steady state, all tax-spending national policy instruments are allowed to react to deviations
from policy targets in a optimized way (see subsection 4.3 below), where the policy targets are
the endogenously determined new steady state values. (c) All the time, namely, both during
the transition and in the steady state, the public debt serves as the residually determined
public financing instrument closing the within-period government budget constraint.
To understand this scenario, imagine that the economy is hit by a temporary adverse
shock to TFP as modelled in equations (24)-(25). This, as the impulse response functions can
show, leads at impact to a contraction in output and a rise in the public debt-to-output ratio.
Then, the policy questions are which tax-spending policy instrument to use over time, and
how strong the reaction of those policy instruments to deviations from targets should be, in
order to minimize cyclical volatility.
4.1.2 Fiscal policy scenario in the foreign country with weak public finances
The role of fiscal policy in the foreign country (defined to be Italy) is twofold: to stabilize
the economy against the same shocks as above and, at the same time, to improve resource
allocation by bringing down its public debt-to-GDP ratio over time. This is typically called
”debt consolidation” in the related literature (see Wren-Lewis, 2010).
Specifically, in our main thought experiment, fiscal policy in the foreign country (i.e. Italy)
is defined as follows: (a) In the new reformed steady state, the country’s output share of public
debt is exogenously set at the target value of 90% (recall that it was around 110% of GDP in
the status quo steady state solution in subsection 3.2).22 Actually, we will study two subcases
here: one in which sovereign premia may remain in this reformed steady state, as determined
endogenously by equation (28), similarly to the status quo model; and one in which, not only
public debt is reduced to 90%, but also sovereign premia are eliminated in the new reformed
steady state, meaning that now we also impose Q = Q∗ in equation (28). Obviously, the
second case, the one without premia, is more ambitious. Modelling details are provided in
22We choose the target value of 90% simply because this is consistent with evidence provided by e.g. Reinhart
and Rogoff (2010) and Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) that, in most advanced economies, the adverse
effects of public debt arise when it is around 90-100% of GDP. We report that our main results are not sensitive
to this value. For instance, we have experimented with a debt target value of 70% or 60% and the results are
qualitatively the same.
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the next subsection right below. (b) In this new reformed steady state, since the country’s
public debt has been reduced and thus fiscal space has been created relative to the status quo,
fiscal spending can be increased and/or tax rates can be cut, depending on which fiscal policy
instrument is assumed to follow residually to close the government budget constraint. This is
known as the long-term fiscal gain from debt consolidation. Here, we will report results only
for the case in which the fiscal space created by debt reduction is used to reduce the capital tax
rate;23 this has been found to be the most efficient way of making use of the fiscal space created
and is consistent with the Chamley-Judd well known normative result that the limiting capital
tax rate should be zero. To put it differently, our solutions confirm, as in most of the literature,
that the impact of debt consolidation depends on expectations about how the fiscal space will
be used in the future and it is expectations of a cut in the capital tax rate that appear to
have a long-lasting beneficial effect on investment and output. (c) Along the transition to the
new reformed steady state, the national tax-spending policy instruments are allowed to react
to deviations from policy targets in a optimized way (see subsection 4.3 below). Given that
the new debt policy target is set at a value lower than in the status quo (i.e. we depart from
110% but the policy target in Italy’s feedback fiscal policy rules is 90%), this requires lower
public spending, and/or higher tax rates, during the early phase of the transition period. This
is known as the short-term fiscal pain of debt consolidation.24
4.1.3 Equilibrium system in the reformed economy: modelling issues
The equilibrium system and modelling details are in Appendix 6. As explained in that
Appendix, the case in which premia are allowed in the new steady state is similar to the
status quo regime in terms of modelling except that in the reformed economy the debt policy
target is 90%. On the other hand, the case in which we also set Q = Q∗ in the new steady
state is more demanding. In particular, elimination of premia, or equivalently equalization
of interest rates, Q = Q∗, means that the international capital market becomes perfect so
that agents can borrow and lend at the same interest rate internationally. For this to happen,
23Results with other instruments are available upon request.
24It is well recognized that debt consolidation implies a tradeoff between short-term pain and medium-term
gain; see e.g. Coenen et al. (2008) and Clinton et al. (2011). During the early phase of the transition, debt
consolidation comes at the cost of higher taxes and/or lower public spending. In the medium- and long-run, a
reduction in the debt burden allows, other things equal, a cut in tax rates, and/or a rise in public spending.
Thus, one has to value the early costs of stabilization vis-a-vis the medium- and long-term benefits from the
fiscal space created. It is also recognized that the implications of fiscal reforms, like debt consolidation, depend
heavily on the public financing policy instrument used, namely, which policy instrument adjusts endogenously
to accommodate the exogenous changes in fiscal policy; see e.g. Leeper et al. (2009). In the case of debt
consolidation, such implications are expected to depend both on which policy instrument bears the cost of
adjustment in the early period of adjustment and on which policy instrument is expected to reap the benefit,
once consolidation has been achieved.
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however, and as discussed in subsection 2.1 above, the discount factors need also to be equalized
across countries. Namely, without financial frictions, the agents should become equally patient
eventually. Thus, β∗ needs to become equal to β at the new steady state (although this is not
required along the transition). To model this, in a relatively neutral way, we assume that the
discount factor in Italy, β∗, follows over time the AR(1) process:
β∗t = ρ
β∗β∗t−1 +
(
1− ρβ∗
)
β (29)
where the initial value is the value used in the status quo solution (see Table 1a) while the value
in the new reformed steady state is set as in Germany (see Table 1a again).25 It is important to
stress that, in case premia are eliminated in the new steady state so that β∗ = β, we will choose
the autoregressive parameter, ρβ
∗
, optimally, alongside all other feedback policy parameters,
so as not to force results in one direction or another. In general, ρβ
∗
can be thought of as
capturing some form of cultural change relative to the status quo, as discussed by e.g. Becker
and Mulligan (1997) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2008).
4.2 Other fiscal policy scenarios studied
In addition to the above defined main experiment, and for reasons of comparison, we will also
study two other policy scenarios:
First, the case in which, other things equal, Italy does not take any active fiscal consoli-
dation measures. That is, acting like Germany, it just departs from, and returns to, the same
tax-spending position (which is the status quo steady state). This case of non-consolidation
typically serves as a benchmark to evaluate the possible merits of fiscal consolidation. Note
that again feedback policy coefficients will be chosen optimally.
Second, we study an exogenous case in which fiscal variables in Italy and Germany mimic
their values in the actual data between 2012 and 2015 (see e.g. EMU-Public Finances, 2015,
p. 15, by the European Commission). In practice, any fiscal consolidation in Italy, during that
period, was achieved by an increase in total tax revenues as share of GDP by around 2 percent-
age points, while total public spending to GDP share remained more or less unchanged.26 At
the same time, in Germany, fiscal policy was kept neutral meaning no changes. To implement
this scenario, in our simulations, we appropriately adjust the feedback policy coefficients on
25The exact numerical value we use for steady state β∗ is not important to our main results. But we do need
β∗ = β to get a well-defined steady state solution to the extent that we do not have premia in this new steady
state.
26In Italy, tax revenues as share of GDP were 45.6% in 2011 and this increased to 47.8% in 2012 and to 48.2%
in 2015.
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public debt in the fiscal policy rules in the two countries, so as the generated values of fiscal
variables (total tax revenues and public spending as shares of GDP) are close to those in the
data during the first four years (namely, 2012-5) after departure from the status quo solution
in Table 2. Thus, under this scenario, policy reaction is not chosen optimally; instead, the
fiscal feedback policy coefficients are adjusted so as to mimic the actual policy in the period
2012-5. The monetary authority’s reaction to weighted inflation in the two countries, φpi, is
also set exogenously at, say, 2 (we report that results for this exogenous case are not sensitive
to this value to the extent that φpi > 1, which is the so-called Taylor principle). Further details
and results of this ad hoc scenario are in subsection 5.2.
4.3 Optimized policy rules, solution methodology and welfare comparison
The single monetary authority can choose the feedback policy coefficients on inflation and
output in the two countries in its single rule for the nominal interest rate (see equation 17
above), while each national fiscal authority can choose the feedback policy coefficients on
national public debt and output in its rules for public spending and tax rates (see equations
18-22 above for each country).
We start with defining the welfare objective of policymakers.
4.3.1 Welfare objective of policymakers
There can be many institutional scenarios regarding the degree of cooperation between the
single monetary authority and the two national fiscal authorities, ranging from full cooperation
to zero cooperation. In this paper, we mainly focus on a scenario of full cooperation at policy
level (however in section 7 below we also study Nash equilibria). Apart from computational
simplicity, we focus on this scenario because, these days, most macroeconomic measures, and
especially fiscal consolidation measures, are taken under the advice, or coordination, of the
European Union and the ECB.
In particular, we assume that all monetary and fiscal feedback policy coefficients are chosen
jointly and simultaneously so as to maximize a weighted average of households’ expected
discounted lifetime utility in the two countries defined as:
Wt = ηVt + (1− η)V ∗t (30)
where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 is the political weight of the domestic country vis-a-vis the foreign country,
i.e. the higher is η, the higher the say of Germany in policy-making (see also equation (17)
above), and Vt and V
∗
t are as defined in equation (7) above for each country. As said, we start
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with the neutral case η = 0.5, but we will experiment with various values of η in section 6.
4.3.2 Computation of optimized feedback policy rules
Except for the ad hoc scenario discussed in subsection 4.2, we compute the welfare-maximizing
values of feedback policy coefficients in the policy rules (this is what Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe,
2005 and 2007, call optimized policy rules). The welfare criterion is to maximize the conditional
welfare of the two households as defined in (30) above, where conditionality refers to the initial
conditions chosen; the latter are given by the status quo solution in Table 2 above, which is close
to the data averages over 2001-2011. To this end, following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004),
we take a second-order approximation to both the equilibrium conditions and the welfare
criterion.27 Specifically, we first compute a second-order approximation of both the conditional
welfare and the decentralized equilbrium around the associated steady state, as functions of
feedback policy coefficients using Dynare and, in turn, we use a matlab function (such as
fminsearch.m) to compute the values of the feedback policy coefficients that maximize this
approximate system (Dynare and matlab routines are available upon request). In this exercise,
if necessary, the feedback policy coefficients are restricted to be within some prespecified ranges
so as to deliver determinacy. All this is with, and without, debt consolidation, where the case
without consolidation will serve as a benchmark.
Regarding the zero lower bound (ZLB) for the nominal interest rate, we work as in e.g.
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), which means that, when necessary, we simply place addi-
tional restrictions on the range of feedback policy coefficients in the Taylor rule, φpi and φy
in equation (17), so that the gross nominal interest rates do not violate the ZLB, in other
words, Rt, Qt, R
∗
t , Q
∗
t > 1. We report that only in the case of flexible exchange rates, stud-
ied in subsection 7.2 below, such additional restrictions will be required (details for this case
are postponed until then). In all other cases, at least under the parameterizations used, the
ZLB is not violated; the main reason seems to be that our initial conditions feature relatively
high debt and relatively high nominal interest rates, which are, in turn, gradually reduced by
optimally chosen debt consolidation policies in the transition.28
27We focus on second-order accurate approximate solutions because, when the model is stochastic, first-order
approximations can give spurious results when used to compare the welfare under alternative policies (see e.g.
the review in Gal´ı, 2008, pp. 110-111). We report that we have also experimented with non-approximate
solutions in the deterministic case and the main results do not change.
28By contrast, the initial conditions in Erceg and Linde´ (2013) are consistent with a deep output contraction,
produced by (among other things) a big adverse TFP shock, which, in combination with the assumed feedback
policy coefficients, leads to sharp policy interest rate cuts in order to keep output near potential and inflation
near target. In our paper, both in the baseline parameterization and in the sensitivity tests in sections 6 and 7,
this possibility does not arise, except in the flexible exchange rate regime discussed below. For a methodology
paper on the ZLB, see e.g. Ferna´ndez–Villaverde et al. (2015).
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4.3.3 Welfare comparison of alternative policy regimes
Comparisons of alternative policy regimes will be in terms of welfare, namely, expected life-
time discounted utility. Welfare differences will then be expressed in terms of consumption
equivalents. The case without debt consolidation will serve as the benchmark in these welfare
comparisons (except otherwise stated).
5 Main results
We work as explained in the previous section. In other words, we depart from the status
quo steady state solution in Table 2 and travel towards a new reformed steady state. In this
new steady state, in Italy, under debt consolidation, public debt has been cut at 90% and the
resulting fiscal space is used to finance a decrease of the capital tax rate, while, by contrast,
in Germany, tax-spending policy instruments remain as in the status quo steady state. Along
the transition to this new steady state, the debt policy target in Italy’s feedback fiscal policy
rules is set at 90% and, except in the case of the ad hoc policy scenario, all feedback policy
coefficients are optimally chosen.
Ideally, we would like to study the case in which all feedback policy coefficients are chosen
optimally and at the same time. Namely, when the single monetary authority reacts to both
inflation and output (see the rule in subsection 2.6.1) and each national fiscal authority reacts
to both public debt and output (see the rules in subsection 2.6.2). However, when all feedback
policy coefficients are simultaneously chosen optimally, the optimization problem becomes too
heavy to be computed (since 18 feedbacks have to be chosen). Therefore, we will start with
the case in which all national fiscal policy instruments are allowed to react to the public debt
gap only and the single monetary policy instrument is allowed to react to the weighted sum
of national inflation rates only, while (fiscal and monetary) policy reaction to output gaps will
be exogenously added in section 6 below.
5.1 Debt consolidation with optimized policy rules
In the reformed economy with debt consolidation in Italy, the debt policy target is 0.9. Thus,
in the steady state of this economy, we set the Italian public debt to GDP ratio, d
∗
TT 1−ν∗y∗H ,
at this target value, 0.9, and allow the capital tax rate, τk∗, to follow residually. As said in
subsection 4.1, we distinguish two cases of this scenario: one in which sovereign premia are
allowed in the reformed steady state (the results are in subsection 5.1.1) and a more ambitious
one where such premia are eliminated (the results are in subsection 5.1.2).
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5.1.1 Allowing for sovereign premia in the steady state of the reformed economy
In this case, the endogenously determined steady state capital tax rate, τk∗, falls from 0.31 (in
the data) to 0.292.29 Table 3 reports the values of the optimized feedback policy coefficients (see
notes of Table 3) and hence the associated policy mix, as well as the resulting level of expected
discounted lifetime utility (see the last column in Table 3). In addition, we report results over
shorter time horizons (see the first three columns).30 This is in both countries. Numbers in
parentheses report welfare levels in the benchmark case without debt consolidation in Italy,
other things equal (this is the first scenario discussed in subsection 4.2). Welfare gains/losses
of debt consolidation vis-a-vis no debt consolidation are in terms of percentage consumption
equivalents, where a positive number means a gain vis-a-vis the case without debt consolidation
and vice versa for a negative number.
Table 3: Welfare over different time horizons with, and without, debt consolidation in Italy
(with premia in the reformed steady state)
2 periods 4 periods 20 periods lifetime
Home (Germany)
0.1304
(0.0811)
0.2373
(0.1589)
0.7681
(0.6802)
2.4843
(2.3889)
welfare gain/loss 0.0169 0.0163 0.0049 0.0016
Foreign (Italy)
0.0418
(0.068)
0.126
(0.1339)
0.6221
(0.5732)
1.5846
(1.5340)
welfare gain/loss -0.0089 -0.0016 0.0029 0.0011
Notes: (i) Optimized policy coefficients φpi = 1.1, γ
g
l = 0.1188, γ
c
l = 0.244, γ
∗g
l = 0.587,
γll = γ
∗l
l = γ
∗c
l = γ
k
l = γ
∗k
l = γ
n
l = γ
∗n
l = 0.(ii) We set η ≡ 0.5. (iii) Results without debt
consolidation in parentheses. (iv) Welfare gains/losses in terms of consumption equivalents.
In terms of policy reaction, the values of the optimized feedback policy coefficients, as
reported in the notes of Table 3, imply that the interest rate policy instrument should react
aggressively to weighted inflation, φpi = 1.1 > 1, which is according to the Taylor principle,
while national fiscal reactions to public debt should be achieved by government consumption
spending and consumption taxes in Germany and by government consumption spending only in
Italy. Obviously, government consumption spending reaction to public debt should be stronger
29Modelling details and the full steady state solution are in Appendix 6.
30The welfare criterion for the choice of feedback policy coefficients is the maximization of expected discounted
lifetime utilities, as defined in equation (30) above. Thus, when we report welfare results for shorter time
horizons, we use these lifetime optimal feedbacks to obtain the discounted utility of different time periods.
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in Italy (the debt consolidating country) than in Germany (the debt accomodating country);
that is, 0.1188 = γgl < γ
∗g
l = 0.587. Notice that both countries should not use any income
taxes for debt accomodation (in Germany) or debt consolidation (in Italy); in other words,
the optimal values of the associated feedback policy coefficients in the rules for the capital and
labor income tax rates are all zero in both countries, γkl = γ
∗k
l = γ
n
l = γ
∗n
l = 0. Intuitively,
since Italy goes for debt consolidation, which requires relatively big cuts in public spending
and/or big tax rises, it is better to avoid the use of fiscal instruments that are particularly
distorting like tax rates. Germany, on the other hand, just stabilizes cyclical debt fluctuations,
which does not require big changes in fiscal instruments, so this can also be achieved by the use
of consumption taxes. But, in both countries, it is a bad idea to use income taxes, the most
distorting fiscal instruments, to address public debt problems. Notice also that neither country
finds it optimal to use transfer payments to stabilize its public debt. That is, the optimized
values of both γll and γ
∗l
l in the policy rules for transfers are zero. This is because, although
cuts in transfer payments are less damaging to output than cuts in government consumption
spending in the short term, the intertemporal welfare cost of debt consolidation is smaller with
cuts in government consumption spending than it would be in a package where consolidation
would take place via cuts in transfers (see subsection 5.3 below for details).
In terms of welfare implications of debt consolidation, expressed as said above in terms of
consumption equivalents, the respective signs in Table 3 imply that debt consolidation in Italy
hurts Italians in the short term, but there are welfare gains in the medium and long term. By
contrast, Germany gains all the time from debt consolidation in Italy. The mechanism behind
these results is again discussed in subsection 5.3 below where we present response functions.
Notice, however, that the size of welfare effects from debt consolidation is relatively small in
Table 3 and this applies especially to the case of Italy, which is the debt consolidating country
(for instance, a value of 0.0011 for lifetime gain means that consumption rises by 0.11% in each
period in Italy). Such a welfare effect looks to be ”small” at least when it is compared to the
welfare effects of e.g. Lucas (1990), who has found a lifetime welfare gain of around 0.027 or
2.7%, when capital taxes are eliminated in the USA. This is why we will also consider a more
ambitious consolidation scenario right below.
Before we move on, Table 4 reports the implications for fiscal policy variables as a result
of the above policy. Numbers are expressed as absolute changes relative to the corresponding
values in the status quo steady state solution. In other words, a value of -0.0665 means that
public consumption spending, as share of GDP, should fall by around 6.65 percentage points
relative to its value in the status quo steady state solution.
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Table 4: Resulting government spending and tax revenues as shares of GDP
2 periods
average
4 periods
average
10 periods
average
20 periods
average
Gov. consumption to GDP
in Germany
0.0078 0.0059 0.0013 0
Gov. consumption to GDP
in Italy
-0.0665 -0.0367 -0.0172 -0.0093
Tax revenues to GDP
in Germany
-0.0092 -0.0069 -0.0014 0.0004
Tax revenues to GDP
in Italy
0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0025 -0.0033
Notes: (i) See notes in Table 3. (ii) Numbers are expressed as absolute changes relative to the
corresponding values in the status quo steady state solution.
5.1.2 Eliminating sovereign premia in the steady state of the reformed economy
We now consider the more ambitious case in which, not only public debt is reduced to 90% but
also sovereign premia are eliminated in the new reformed steady state.31 Results are reported
in Tables 5 and 6. The difference between Tables 5 and 6 on one hand, and Tables 3 and 4
on the other hand, is that in Tables 5 and 6 we also eliminate sovereign premia in the steady
state of the reformed economy.
Comparison of Tables 5 and 3 reveals that the qualitative results do not change. On the
other hand, welfare implications are bigger now. In particular, Germany’s discounted utilities
are all higher in Table 5 than in Table 3. Also, the elimination of premia benefits Italy more
in the long run (in Table 3, discounted lifetime utility was 1.5846, while it is 2.765 in Table 5)
but this comes at a higher cost in the short term (Italy’s discounted utilities over the first 2,
4 and 20 periods are lower in Table 5 than in Table 3). Intuitively, a more ambitious policy
leads to higher payoffs in the medium and long term but it also means bigger sacrifices in the
short term. Subsection 5.3 below discusses the mechanism behind these welfare results.
31Modelling details and the full steady state solution are in Appendix 6.
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Table 5: Welfare over different time horizons with, and without, debt consolidation in Italy
(without premia in the reformed steady state)
2 periods 4 periods 20 periods lifetime
Domestic (Germany)
0.1424
(0.0811)
0.2751
(0.1589)
1.0543
(0.6802)
2.8979
(2.3889)
welfare gain/loss 0.0210 0.0243 0.0212 0.0085
Foreign (Italy)
−0.0421
(0.068)
−0.0099
(0.1339)
0.4585
(0.5732)
2.765
(1.534)
welfare gain/loss -0.0345 -0.0296 -0.0067 0.0208
Notes: (i) Optimized policy coefficients φpi = 1.103, γ
g
l = 0.014, γ
∗g
l = 0.5619,
γll = γ
∗l
l = γ
c
l= γ
∗c
l = γ
k
l = γ
∗k
l = γ
n
l = γ
∗n
l = 0 and ρ
β∗ = 0 . (ii) We set η ≡ 0.5. (iii) Results
without debt consolidation in parentheses. (iv) Welfare gains/losses in terms of consumption
equivalents.
Table 6: Resulting government spending and tax revenues as shares of GDP
2 periods
average
4 periods
average
10 periods
average
20 periods
average
Gov. consumption to GDP
in Germany
0.0005 0.0009 0.001 0.0006
Gov. consumption to GDP
in Italy
-0.0538 -0.0252 -0.014 0.0101
Tax revenues to GDP
in Germany
0.0028 0.0023 0.0016 0.001
Tax revenues to GDP
in Italy
-0.0087 -0.0104 -0.0104 -0.01
Notes: (i) See notes in Table 5. (ii) Numbers are expressed as absolute changes relative to the
corresponding values in the status quo steady state solution.
In terms of policy reaction, the values of the optimized feedback policy coefficients, as
reported in the notes of Table 5, are similar to those in Table 3. The only difference is that
now both countries should react to public debt by using government consumption spending
only. In other words, the optimal values of all other feedback policy coefficients are zero in
both countries. Obviously, as before, the reaction of government consumption spending to
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public debt should be stronger in Italy (the debt consolidating country) than in Germany (the
debt accomodating country); that is, 0.014 = γgl < γ
∗g
l = 0.5619 in Table 5.
Besides, it is important to notice, as reported in the notes of Table 5, that the optimally
chosen value of the persistence parameter in the AR(1) process for Italy’s discount factor,
ρβ
∗
, is practically zero meaning that it would be optimal for Italians to adopt the patience
of Germans and this should be done as soon as possible. Although we realize that cultural
characteristics, like the degree of patience, can change very slowly, we believe that this is a
useful normative result.
5.2 Debt consolidation with exogenous data-mimicking policy
Here, we study the scenario described in subsection 4.2. Namely, we repeat the same policy
experiment as in subsection 5.1.1, except that, now, debt reduction to 0.9 in Italy is achieved
by ad hoc changes in fiscal policy variables, which are similar to those actually implemented in
the post-2011 period. We also assume that there can be risk premia in the new reformed steady
state, which is as in subsection 5.1.1, and that the fiscal space created by debt reduction in
Italy is used to finance an increase in transfer payments at steady state, rather than a decrease
in capital tax rates as in the optimal cases.32
Results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. These two tables should be compared to Tables
3 and 4 (optimized policy with premia in the steady state) or to Tables 5 and 6 (optimized
policy without premia in the steady state). Inspection of the results in Tables 7 and 8, and
comparison with the previous ones, reveals that consolidation in Italy is now harmful for both
countries and across all time intervals.
Therefore, the way public debt is brought down is important. Bringing public debt down
in an exogenous way, similar to the one actually followed by Italy (i.e. mainly an increase in
tax revenues) proves to be welfare-deteriorating all the time and for both countries vis-a-vis
the case without debt consolidation and, naturally, is welfare inferior relative to the normative
case where fiscal reaction policy is chosen optimally (meaning an optimally chosen cut in
public consumption spending). In other words, there is room for considerable improvement in
European policies in view of the current debt crisis. A discussion of the reasons behind these
results is provided in the next subsection.
32In the exogenous case, we assume that the fiscal space is used to finance higher transfer payments simply
because, in most DSGE models with exogenous policy, it is transfers that usually serve as the residually deter-
mined fiscal policy instrument in steady state. We report however that our qualitative results do not depend
on this. For instance, we have also experimented with the case in which it is the capital tax rate that takes
advantage of the fiscal space as we did in the optimal cases studied in subsection 5.1. The welfare inferiority of
the exogenous case gets smaller but it is still there; it is now driven by ad hoc policies in the transition only.
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Table 7: Welfare over different time horizons with, and without, debt consolidation in Italy
(exogenous policy as implied by the data)
2 periods 4 periods 20 periods lifetime
Domestic (Germany)
0.0745
(0.0811)
0.1411
(0.1589)
0.5688
(0.6802)
2.1645
(2.3889)
welfare gain/loss -0.0022 -0.0037 -0.0062 -0.0062
Foreign (Italy)
0.0677
(0.068)
0.1276
(0.1339)
0.5083
(0.5732)
1.4092
(1.534)
welfare gain/loss -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0038 -0.0027
Notes: (i) Ad-hoc policy coefficients φpi = 2, γ
g
l = 0.05, γ
∗g
l = 0, γ
c
l = γ
k
l = γ
n
l = 0,
γ∗cl = γ
∗k
l = γ
∗n
l = 0.08, (ii) We set η ≡ 0.5. (iii) Results without debt consolidation in
parentheses. (iv) Welfare gains/losses in terms of consumption equivalents.
Table 8: Resulting government spending and tax revenues as shares of GDP
(policy as in the actual data)
2 periods
average
4 periods
average
10 periods
average
20 periods
average
Gov. spending to GDP
in Germany
0.001 0 0 0
Gov. spending to GDP
in Italy
0 0 0 0
Tax revenues to GDP
in Germany
0 0 0 0
Tax revenues to GDP
in Italy
0.023 0.0205 0.0155 0.01
Notes: (i) See notes in Table 7. (ii) Numbers are expressed as absolute changes relative to the
corresponding values in the status quo steady state solution.
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5.3 Response functions and discussion of the main mechanisms
To understand the logic behind the above welfare results, we now present the associated re-
sponse functions. Figure 1 plots the simulated paths of the main fiscal policy instruments and
the resulting public debt-to-GDP ratio in the foreign country (Italy), which is the country that
undertakes the debt consolidation measures; these paths are shown in levels (i.e. percentage
points).33 Figure 2 plots the paths of the main macroeconomic variables in the two countries;
these paths are shown as percentage deviations from their status quo steady state values (ex-
cept from net exports, NE and NE∗, which are presented as shares of GDP). Figure 3 shows
the paths of various price indices in the two countries; these paths are shown in levels. All
response functions are computed from first-order approximations around the associated new
reformed steady state when transition dynamics are driven by debt consolidation measures
only.
The red line shows the case with optimized feedback policy rules as studied in subsection
5.1.1. The blue line shows the case in which the fiscal policy instruments are set as implied by
the data as explained in subsection 5.2. The green horizontal straight line shows the initial,
status quo value of the corresponding variable as reported in Table 2.34 In other words, the
simulations shown in red are implemented as the transition from the status quo steady state in
Table 2 to the new reformed steady state in Italy with a lower public debt than in the status
quo (from 110% to 90%) and hence with a lower capital tax rate, while, along the transition, all
national fiscal policy instruments in both countries are allowed to react optimally to the public
debt gap. On the other hand, the simulations shown in blue color plot the sub-optimal case
in which, although again the Italian public debt is brought down to 90% in the new reformed
steady state, this is achieved by following the exogenous data-mimicking policy mix studied in
subsection 5.2 (as can be seen in Figure 1, this implies a short-term rise in all three tax rates
by around 1.5 percentage point relative to their status quo values).
33Recall that, under optimized rules, only government consumption spending should be used, while, under ad
hoc policy, debt consolidation has been achieved by higher taxes.
34In the welfare results reported in the tables, we also had temporary TFP shocks. Here, in these response
functions, we switch off these shocks so that transition dynamics is driven by policy reforms in the high-debt
country only. This allows us to see more clearly the main mechanisms behind various debt consolidation
policies. Notice that without shocks, the steady state solution (the green line) is also the solution without debt
consolidation used as the benchmark in our welfare comparisons in the tables. In Appendix 7.1, we provide the
same response functions except that there we also include a temporary adverse shock to Italy’s TFP, so that
the non-consolidation case exhibits transition dynamics too. The main messages remain the same.
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Figure 1: Response functions of public debt to GDP and fiscal instruments in Italy
(in levels)
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Regarding fiscal policy, inspection of the response functions for Italy’s fiscal instruments
in Figure 1 illustrates that, under optimized policy rules, only public consumption spending
should fall on impact to bring public debt down, while, the blue lines show the rise in the
three effective tax rates in the case of the ad hoc data-mimicking policy. As a consequence,
the speed of adustment is faster under optimized rules (in the first three years, the public
debt to GDP ratio is reduced from 109% to 92% under optimal policy, while, under exogenous
policy, it is reduced to 102% only; also, the debt target value, 90%, is reached after ten years
under optimal policy, while it takes 27 years under exogenous policy). In other words, when
we use a relatively little distorting instrument, like a cut in government consumption spending,
it is welfare-enhancing to front-load the fiscal adjustment, even if this comes at the cost of a
relatively big output contraction on impact (see the red line for y∗H in Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Response functions of main macro variables in Germany and Italy
(in percentage deviations from status-quo steady state)
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Regarding interest rates and relative prices as well as their macro effects, Figure 3 confirms
that nominal interest rates, R and R∗, as well as real interest rates, RΠ and
R∗
Π∗ , both fall over
time as a result of debt consolidation (strictly speaking, the real interest rates fall after a sharp
jump on impact). The anticipation of lower real interest rates over time is good for capital
accumulation in the whole currency union area. In Italy, the crowding-in of capital is further
strengthened by the anticipation of lower capital tax rates in the new reformed steady state.
These effects are behind the different behavior of k and k∗ over time (see the red lines for k
and k∗ in Figure 2). In turn, in Italy, a higher k∗ implies a higher marginal product of labour
so that work hours rise too after a fall in the short term (see the red line for n∗ in Figure
2) and the combination of more capital and more labor leads to more output produced, y∗H ,
over time. Notice also the clear co-movement of capital, k, work hours, n, and output, yH , in
Germany. The improvement in the terms of trade in favor of Italy, as shown by the red line
for TT in Figure 3, results in an immediate increase in Italian net exports, NE∗, and so a fall
in Germany’s NE, as shown by the red lines in Figure 2. Finally, comparing this optimal case
to the ad hoc case, notice that the fall in interest rates (nominal and real) is bigger and lasts
longer under optimal than under ad hoc policy and that Italy’s terms of trade do not improve
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under the ad hoc case (see red and blue lines in Figure 3).
Regarding consumption, it rises in both countries in the short term as a result of optimized
fiscal consolidation in Italy (see the red lines for c and c∗ in Figure 2). This is mainly driven
by the anticipation of lower real interest rates across the whole currency area over time, which
induces households to bring forward their spending plans (the standard intertemporal substi-
tution effect) and hence crowds in consumption plans in the short term. In Italy, there is an
additional wealth effect on consumption, as agents anticipate that their net-of-tax wealth will
increase thanks to the decrease in the public debt burden and the associated fall in taxes in
the new steady state.35 After the initial rise, c and c∗ start falling in the medium term, as the
real interest rates start rising relatively to their initial cuts. Notice that the positive effect on
initial consumption is stronger and more lasting in Germany (and this results in higher welfare,
as also shown in Tables 3 and 5). This happens mainly because consumption in Italy, c∗, has
to make room for higher investment and exports, as discussed above; however, eventually c∗
will be higher in the new reformed steady state than in the status quo steady state.36 Finally,
comparing this optimized case to the ad hoc case, consumption suffers in both countries under
the ad hoc scenario (see the blue lines for c and c∗ in Figure 2) and this partly explains the
welfare inferiority of the ad hoc regime. Looking at the response functions, this can be ex-
plained by a number of developments; for instance, in the ad hoc case, the fall in real interest
rates is not so strong, there is no anticipation of a cut in distorting income taxes in the long
run and the initial recession lasts longer.
All the above shape the dynamics of output. The simulations in Figure 2 show that Italian
output falls sharply on impact (this is the direct effect of the cut in public spending), but it
manages to recover fast under optimal policy for the reasons explained right above (this is
illustrated by the red line for y∗H in Figure 2). German output is affected in the opposite
direction from Italy’s (see the red line for yH in Figure 2); namely, in the transition to the new
steady state, yH first rises and then falls (although this fall is small quantitatively) as Italian
output starts rising.37 As discussed above, the main reasons behind the (small) fall in output
35Thus, in this consolidation scenario, consumption and leisure both rise in Italy in the short term relative to
non-consolidation. This means that the welfare cost of debt consolidation in the early periods reported in Table
3 is due to the cut in public spending. If public spending is not valued in the utility function, consolidation
is welfare superior to non-consolidation even in the short term (see also subsection 6.4 below). In the scenario
in Table 5, the early welfare cost of consolidation is higher because consumption also falls in the short term in
Italy (see below for this scenario).
36See the solutions for c∗ in Table 2 above (status quo steady state) and in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix
(steady state solutions with debt consolidation in Italy).
37Table 2 in the main text reports the status quo steady state solution, while Tables A1 and A2 in the
Appendix report the steady state solutions with debt consolidation in Italy. As can be seen, yH in Tables A1
and A2 is higher than, or equal to, yH in Table 2.
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in Germany in the medium term, after the positive effect from lower interest rates in the short
term, are the decrease in its exports (see NE and NE∗ in Figure 2), and the fact that Italy
gets the lion’s share in new capital accumulation (see k and k∗ in Figure 2) along the transition
path to the new steady state. Finally, comparing this optimized case to the ad hoc case, there
is a long-lasting recession under the ad hoc tax-based scenario (see the blue line for y∗H in
Figure 2). Thus, an optimally chosen fiscal package, based on cuts in consumption spending,
can make the output cost of fiscal adjustment temporary and relatively small.38 39
Figure 3: Response functions of main price indices in Germany and Italy (in levels)
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Before we close this section, we briefly report two other results. First, recall that we have
38We have also experimented with other ad hoc cases, like a relatively sharp increase in tax rates and a
relatively small decrease in public spending. Then, if the criterion is output in Italy, y∗H (in particular, how
deep is the contractionary impact of consolidation at short horizons and how long this contraction lasts), then
the best scenario is the optimal one (as shown in Figure 1, this scenario translates into a strong cut in public
spending on impact), next is the one with a mild decrease in public spending which causes a milder contraction
on impact but more long-lasting than the optimal case, then comes the data-mimicking scenario which generates
a persistent contraction, and finally is the case with a sharp rise in tax rates which produces a sharp output
contraction. Response functions are available upon request.
39Erceg and Linde´ (2013) find that, in a currency union, a tax-based consolidation depresses output by less
than a spending-based consolidation in the short term. That is, although we get similar results at longer
horizons, our results differ at short horizons. This difference in the short term can be due to model differences,
to the way countries are assumed to differ or to the fact that they employ exogenous values for the feedback
policy coefficients.
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also studied the more ambitious case in which, not only public debt is reduced, but also premia
are eliminated, in the new reformed steady state (see subsection 5.1.2). The main difference of
this more ambitious case40 from the case in which premia remain in the new reformed steady
state (this was the case illustrated in Figures 1-3) is that, under the former, the crowd-in of
capital is much stronger in Italy and this leads to a rise in work hours and even a rise in this
country’s output from the very start. In other words, our simulations can support the debated
argument made by e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Alesina and Perotti (1997) or Alesina and
Ardagna (1998) that fiscal contractions are output-expansionary even in the short term,41 only
when such contractions are accompanied by cultural changes and in particular in the degree of
patience in the country that undergoes debt consolidation. Also, in this more ambitious case,
the cross-border beneficial effect on Germany’s consumption is more permanent than in Figure
2. Second, recall that in all cases with optimized rules studied so far, it has not been optimal to
use cuts in transfer payments to bring public debt down during the transition. To understand
why, we have also examined the case in which debt consolidation would take place via ad
hoc cuts in government transfers.42 As the response functions show, such cuts, although they
allow Italy to avoid the short-term fall in output observed when debt consolidation takes place
via cuts in government consumption spending, they lead to lower private consumption, lower
capital and lower leisure over time. This makes the transfer-cut package welfare-inferior to the
optimized case in which debt consolidation takes place via cuts in government consumption
spending. Notice that, under transfer cuts, consumption falls because real interest rates (after
a temporary fall on impact) rise, which creates an adverse intertemporal substitution effect.
Relatively high real interest rates also explain the crowing-out of capital. All this translates
to the zero feedback coefficients on debt in the optimized rule for transfers, and the positive
ones in the optimized rule for government consumption (see Tables 3 and 5 above).
6 Sensitivity analysis and extensions
We now check the robustness of our results. We will focus on changes in the two countries’
political power (subsection 6.1), reaction to the output gap (subsection 6.2), shocks to initial
debt when consolidation efforts start (subsection 6.3), the introduction of government invest-
ment (subsection 6.4) and the addition of non-Ricardian households (subsection 6.5). Following
usual practice, we will study one change at a time. Before we present results for these richer
40To save on space, the response functions of this more ambitious case are presented in Appendix 7.2
41See also Coenen et al. (2008) and EEAG Report (2014, chapter 3) for this argument.
42To save on space, the response functions of this ad hoc case are presented in Appendix 7.3.
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cases, we report that the above results are robust to changes in all other parameter values
listed in Table 1a above, at least within reasonable ranges.
Since the welfare benefits of debt consolidation have been found to be stronger in the case
in which premia are also eliminated in the steady state of the reformed economy (see the results
in Tables 5 and 6), in what follows, we work with this case when we refer to consolidation. We
report, however, that the qualitative results are the same when the comparison is relative to
the less ambitious policy experiment in Tables 3 and 4 where premia can remain in the new
reformed steady state.
6.1 Does political power matter?
So far, we have restricted ourselves to the ”politically correct” case in which the two countries
shared equal power in policy decision making. That is, we have set the weight η in equation
(30) at the neutral value of 0.5. The higher is η, the more Germany matters to policy decision-
making in this equation. New results in the range 0.5 ≤ η < 1 are reported in Tables 9 and
10. To save on space, we focus again on the best policy mix found, namely, when both Italy
and Germany use public consumption spending in the transition phase, while Italy cuts capital
taxes once its fiscal consolidation has been implemented.
First of all, observe that welfare differences are quantitatively small as η changes. This
should be expected since here we compare results under optimized rules. Keeping this in
mind, the main messages are as follows. Table 9 implies that the higher the say of Germany
in policy decision making, the better off Germany, and the worse off Italy, become. This is
as expected. Table 10 implies that the higher the say of Germany, the stronger the fiscal
consolidation in Italy. This is shown by the monotonic positive effect of η on the magnitude of
the feedback fiscal policy coefficient on public debt in Italy, γg∗l (the other optimized feedback
policy coefficients remain practically zero, as in the previous section).
Table 9: Effect of political weight on lifetime utility
weight world E0W0 home E0V0 foreign E0V
∗
0
η = 0.5 2.8315 2.8979 2.765
η = 0.6 2.8460 2.9009 2.7635
η = 0.7 2.8598 2.9012 2.7634
η = 0.8 2.8735 2.9027 2.7565
η = 0.9 2.8887 2.9042 2.7488
Notes: The weight in the Taylor rule is kept at 0.5 (not important).
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Table 10: Effect of political weight on feedback policy coefficients
political weight
monetary
reaction
to inflation
home fiscal
reaction
to debt
foreign fiscal
reaction
to debt
η = 0.5 φpi = 1.1 γ
g
l = 0.014 γ
∗g
l = 0.5619
η = 0.6 φpi = 1.1 γ
g
l = 0.015 γ
∗g
l = 0.6389
η = 0.7 φpi = 1.1 γ
g
l = 0.014 γ
∗g
l = 0.6454
η = 0.8 φpi = 1.1 γ
g
l = 0.016 γ
∗g
l = 0.7636
η = 0.9 φpi = 1.1 γ
g
l = 0.014 γ
∗g
l = 0.8607
Notes: See notes in Table 9.
6.2 Allowing for reaction to the output gap
So far we have allowed for optimal reaction to inflation only (on the part of the single monetary
authority) and to public debt only (on the part of national fiscal authorities). That is, we have
not allowed monetary and/or fiscal policy instruments to react optimally to the output gap
too. As explained above, this has been for computational reasons only. Nevertheless, although
we cannot allow at the same time all feedback policy coefficients in subsections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2
to be chosen optimally, we can at least experiment with various exogenously set values of
national feeback fiscal reaction to the output gap. Monetary policy reaction to inflation and
national fiscal policy reactions to public debt are optimally chosen as above (while again we
set φy = 0 for the central bank).
43
Table 11 reports the implications for expected discounted lifetime utility in the two coun-
tries, when Italy uses its income (capital and labor) tax rates in a counter-cyclical way, meaning
that these two distorting tax rates decrease when the output gap is negative and the opposite
when the output gap is positive, while the rest of the experiment remains as in subsection
5.1.2. In particular, in Table 11, we ad hoc set γ∗kl = γ
∗n
l ≡ 0.5 in the rules for the capital and
labor tax rates in Italy (we report that our qualitative results do not depend on the particular
values assumed for these two feedback coefficients). Comparison of Table 11 to, for instance,
Table 5 implies two results: First, welfare rises in Table 11 relative to Table 5. Second, and
more interesting, Table 11 implies a clear assigment of policy instruments to policy targets
during the transition phase: public consumption spending should be cut to address the public
debt gap and, at the same time, capital and labor tax rates should also be reduced to mitigate
43Monetary policy reaction to output, φy > 0, is bad for welfare. That is, as φy rises, welfare deteriorates
in both countries. See also e.g. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) and Philippopoulos et al. (2015) in closed
economies.
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the recessionary effects of debt consolidation.
Table 11: Welfare over different time horizons with, and without, debt consolidation in Italy
(plus ad-hoc reaction to output gap via income taxes in Italy)
2 periods 4 periods 20 periods lifetime
Home (Germany)
0.1407
(0.0811)
0.2742
(0.1589)
1.0709
(0.6802)
2.9080
(2.3889)
welfare gain/loss 0.0204 0.0241 0.0221 0.0087
Foreign (Italy)
−0.0322
(0.068)
−0.0048
(0.1339)
0.4841
(0.5732)
2.7750
(1.534)
welfare gain/loss -0.0336 -0.0286 -0.0052 0.0277
Notes: (i) Optimized policy coefficients φpi = 1.1, γ
g
l = 0.014, γ
∗g
l = 0.4942,
γll = γ
c
l = γ
k
l = γ
n
l = γ
∗l
l = γ
∗c
l = γ
∗k
l = γ
∗n
l = 0 and ρ
β∗ = 0 (ii) We set γ∗kl = γ
∗n
l ≡ 0.5 and
η ≡ 0.5 (iii) Results without debt consolidation in parentheses. (iv) Welfare gains/losses are in terms
of consumption equivalents.
6.3 Shocks to initial debt
Now we shock the initial public debt in Italy so as to rise from 110% to, say, 130%. All the
rest remains as in section 5 above. The new results are reported in Table 12. Qualitatively,
the results are as in Tables 3 or 5. Notice however that, with a higher public debt initially, the
fiscal pain is bigger than in the previous tables.
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Table 12: Welfare over different time horizonswith, and without, debt consolidation in Italy
(with a higher initial debt)
2 periods 4 periods 20 periods lifetime
Home (Germany)
0.1775
(0.0811)
0.3449
(0.1589)
1.2575
(0.6802)
3.1538
(2.3889)
welfare gain/loss 0.0332 0.0392 0.0329 0.0129
Foreign (Italy)
−0.0839
(0.068)
−0.0605
(0.1339)
0.3765
(0.5732)
2.6945
(1.534)
welfare gain/loss -0.0502 -0.0394 -0.011 0.0196
Notes: (i) Optimized policy coefficients φpi = 1.1, γ
g
l = 0.014, γ
∗g
l = 0.443,
γll = γ
c
l = γ
k
l = γ
n
l = γ
∗l
l = γ
∗c
l = γ
∗k
l = γ
∗n
l = 0 and ρ
β∗ = 0.(ii) We set η ≡ 0.5. (iii) Results
without debt consolidation in parentheses. (iv) Welfare gains/losses are in terms of consumption
equivalents.
6.4 The role of government spending
So far we have assumed that government purchases of goods and services played a utility-
enhancing role. Specifically, these purchases served as an argument in households’ utility
function and this utility-enhancing effect was measured by the preference parameter χg ≥ 0 in
equation 8 (which has been set at 0.1 so far). In this subsection, we first check the sensitivity
of our results to changes in the value of χg and then enrich the model by also allowing for a
productivity-enhancing role of public spending.
Regarding utility-enhancing government spending, we report that we have started with
χg = 0 and then experimented with various positive values. Our qualitative results for the
optimal policy mix do not change. On the other hand, when χg gets higher than 0.3, the optimal
reaction of public government spending to public debt imbalances becomes weaker meaning
a smaller cut in public spending. At the other extreme, when χg is close to zero, the cut in
public spending (chosen for debt consolidation) does not hurt welfare so that debt consolidation
becomes welfare superior to non-debt consolidation even in the short term (compare this to
the results in Table 3 where χg = 0.1). These are intuitive results.
Regarding productivity-enhancing government spending, we now assume that government
activities can also serve an an input to private production. In particular, we augment the
firm’s production function in equation (13) to:
yHt (h) = At(g
i
t)
κ[kt−1(h)]α[nt(h)]1−α (31)
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where git denotes per capita productivity-enhancing government spending on goods and services
and 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 is a technology parameter.44 Notice that, for simplicity, and as in e.g. Baxter
and King (1993), we maintain the assumption of CRS over private inputs.
As we have done so far with other types of public spending, we set git = s
i
ty
H
t , where s
i
t is
the ratio of real government investment to real GDP.45 This new fiscal instrument is allowed
to follow the feedback rule:
sit − si = −γil (lt−1 − l)− γiy
(
yHt − yH
)
(32)
where γil, γ
i
y ≥ 0 are new feedback policy coefficients. Note that we have similar equations for
the foreign country and the feedback policy coefficients are again chosen optimally.
Details of the new model, the new government budget constraint and the resulting final
equilibrium system are in Appendix 8. Here, we just report that the main results do not
change and that the optimized values of the feedback policy coeffcients on public liabilities in
both countries, γil and γ
∗i
l , are found to be zero in all experiments.
46 That is, it is not optimal
to use an instrument like government investment, which practically determines the effective
TFP, for debt consolidation. Debt consolidation should be left to less distorting fiscal policy
instruments, like government consumption spending.
6.5 Does agent heterogeneity matter?
So far we have assumed that households are identical within each country. Although it might
be true that debt consolidation is a uniform reform across agents, agents are heterogeneous
so that even an aggregate reform, or shock, can affect them differently. There can be many
types of agent heterogeneity. Here, we focus on a particular type that has been common in
this literature. We distinguish between ”Ricardian” households, defined as those who have
access to financial and capital markets and own the country’s firms, and ”non-Ricardian”
households, who have no access to financial markets and do not own physical or financial
capital. We assume that the fraction of Ricardian households is 0 < νr ≤ 1 and the fraction
of non-Ricardian ones is 0 ≤ νnr = 1− νr < 1, and similarly in the foreign country.
44Note that we use public investment (which is a flow) rather than public capital (which is a stock) in the
production function. This is for simplicity only (our qualitative results do not depend on this).
45Thus, we now distinguish between utility-enhancing government purchases of goods and services (whose
output share is sgt ) and productivity-enhancing ones (whose output share is s
i
t), where the former are measured
by government consumption spending and the latter by government investment spending in the data.
46Following Baxter and King (1993) and most of the related literature, in the baseline parameterization, we
start with κ equal to 0.05, which is also close to the GDP share of public investment in the data. We report
that our results are not sensitive to this value. Note that as above we switch off the reaction to output gap for
computational reasons.
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Details of the new model, the behavior of the new non-Ricardian agents and the resulting
final equilibrium system are in Appendix 8. Here, we only report some numerical results. To
get these results, we set νr = νnr = 0.5.
47 We also need to recalibrate the new model so as
to bring it again close to the data.48 Using all this, we get the numerical results reported in
Table 13, which is like Table 5 above.49 In Table 13, in each cell, we report results for the
two types of households distinguished by a slash, i.e. in the first cell, 0.6575 is the two-period
discounted utility of the Ricardian agent and 0.075 is that of the non-Ricardian household in
the home country. The same applies to all cells.
Table 13: Welfare over different time horizons with, and without, debt consolidation in Italy
with Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents (without premia in the reformed steady state)
2 periods 4 periods 20 periods lifetime
Home
(Germany)
0.657/0.070
(0.578/0.022)
1.287/0.143
(1.138/0.044)
5.457/0.557
(5.002/0.204)
18.053/1.496
(17.483/0.690)
welfare
gain/loss
0.0272/0.0164 0.0314/0.0207 0.0259/0.02 0.0096/0.0136
Foreign
(Italy)
0.437/− 0.010
(0.572/− 0.007)
0.946/− 0.002
(1.119/− 0.013)
4.690/0.273
(4.727/0.006)
17.679/1.451
(13.153/− 0.144)
welfare
gain/loss
-0.0445/-0.0011 -0.0351/0.0023 -0.002/0.0151 0.0785/0.027
Notes: (i) Optimized policy coefficients φpi = 1.1, γ
g
l = 0.1165, γ
∗g
l = 0.7499,
γll = γ
c
l = γ
k
l = γ
n
l = γ
∗l
l = γ
∗c
l = γ
∗k
l = γ
∗n
l = 0 and ρ
β∗ = 0. (ii) We set η ≡ 0.5. (iii) Results
without debt consolidation in parentheses. (iv) Welfare gains/losses in terms of consumption
equivalents.
Inspection of the results in Table 13 reveals that the main messages do not change. Namely,
focusing on welfare gains/losses which are in consumption equivalents, debt consolidation im-
plies a short-term cost for both types of agents in the country that undergoes consolidation
47This is a value close to that used by Erceg and Linde´ (2013). Priftis and Vogel (2016), and several other
studies by the ECB cited in their paper, set νr = 0.6. We report that our main results do not change within
the range 0.45 < νr ≤ 1.
48In particular, we recalibrate the risk premium parameter and lump-sum transfers/taxes in the two countries
so as to hit net foreign debt and public debt as shares of GDP in the data. Thus, we set ψ = 0.071, sl = −0.187
and s∗l = −0.1905. The new steady state solution, which should be compared to that in Table 2, is presented
in Appendix 8.
49The welfare criterion in each country is now a weighted average of the welfare of the two income groups,
where as weights we use their population fractions; thus, Vt ≡ νrVr,t + (1− νr)Vnr,t in the domestic economy
and V ∗t ≡ ν∗rV ∗r,t + (1− ν∗r)V ∗nr,t in the foreign economy, where the functions are defined in Appendix 8.
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(Italy), while both types of agents benefit across all time windows in the other country (Ger-
many). In Italy, Ricardian households or ”the rich” seem to suffer more from debt consolidation
than non-Ricardian households or ”the poor” in the near term (this is in terms of both con-
sumption and leisure), but they eventually benefit more when the criterion is lifetime utility, as
debt consolidation crowds-in capital at longer horizons (see subsection 5.3 above) and the lat-
ter is owned by Ricardian households only. Also, relative to the results in Table 5, notice that
the optimal reaction of public spending to debt imbalances is bigger now (it is γ∗gl = 0.7499,
while it was γ∗gl = 0.5619 in Table 5), which means that Italy should go for a sharper cut
in public spending on impact relative to the case with a representative household. Based on
the related simulation results, our interpretation is that, since now the government also cares
about non-Ricardian households whose main source of income is income from labor, it finds
it optimal to front-load the fiscal adjustment so as to make the loss in employment, or work
hours, as temporary as possible.50
Notice that again it is not optimal to use cuts in transfer payments for debt consolidation
(see the optimized values of the feedbacks in the notes of Table 13). This happens not only for
the reasons discussed at the very end of subsection 5.3, but also because now, with household
heterogeneity, transfer payments do not appear only in the government budget constraint (see
the equilibrium system presented in Appendix 8); in other words, cuts in transfers are now
more distorting than in the case of the representative household. We also report that the main
results do not change when we assume agent-specific transfers (see Appendix 8 for modelling
details). For instance, when we assume, other things equal, that the per capita transfer given to
the non-Ricardian household is higher than the transfer given to the Ricardian household, non-
Ricardian households get better off, and Ricardian households get worse off, but the optimal
policy mix does not change.51
Before we move on, and as we also say in the closing section below, we recognize that the
distributional implications of debt consolidation is an important issue on its own so the above
experiments obviously do not exhaust its study.
50The short-term fall in employment is more persistent in the single agent case (see Figure 2 above) than in
the present scenario and this applies in particular to the employment of non-Ricardian households whose fall is
very temporary. The new response functions are available upon request.
51We have also experimented with the case in which, in the new reformed steady state, the fiscal space, created
by a lower debt burden, is used to finance transfers targeted to non-Ricardians (namely, these transfers play
the role of the residual fiscal instrument in this steady state solution). Again, non-Ricardians get better off but
this is not Pareto improving. All these numerical results are availabe upon request.
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7 Other policy regimes: Non-cooperative policies and flexible
exchange rates
We finally consider two different policy regimes from those studied so far. In subsection 7.1,
we study non-cooperative (Nash) policies. In subsection 7.2, we consider what would have
happened under flexible exchange rates. Again, we study one change at a time.
7.1 Non-cooperative (Nash) policies
So far, we have studied a fully cooperative policy scenario (recall the discussion in subsection
4.3.1 above). We now study the case in which the single monetary authority and the two
national fiscal authorities do not cooperate with each other.
Since this is a more demanding problem computationally than its counterpart under co-
operation (with cooperation, we had to compute only one policy optimization problem), we
focus on the following case. Working again with optimized feedback policy rules (as we have
done so far), we assume that the single monetary authority chooses its feedback reaction to
weighted inflation in the two countries and, at the same time, the two national fiscal auhorities
choose their feedback reactions to their own public liabilities, and all this is modelled as a
non-cooperative (Nash) game among these three policymakers. More specifically, (i) the single
monetary authority chooses φpi in its nominal interest rate policy rule (see equation 17) to
maximize the union’s welfare, Wt = ηVt + (1− η)V ∗t (see equation 30) for given national fiscal
policies, (ii) the domestic country’s government chooses the vector γ ≡ {γgl , γll, γcl , γkl , γnl } in
its fiscal policy rules (see equations 18 to 22) to maximize the welfare of the domestic house-
hold, Vt (see equation 7) for given monetary and foreign fiscal policy, and (iii) the foreign
country’s government chooses the vector γ∗ ≡ {γ∗gl , γ∗ll , γ∗cl , γ∗kl , γ∗nl } in its fiscal policy rules
(which are like equations 18 to 22) to maximize the welfare of its own household, V ∗t (which
is like equation 7) for given monetary and domestic fiscal policy. In doing so, all three policy
authorities are constrained by the world equilibrium system (see subsection 2.8) which was
for given policy coefficients. To compute this Nash game, we work similarly to Mendoza and
Tesar (2005), who, however, solve for the optimal level of capital tax rates rather than for the
optimal magnitude of feedback coefficients in the assumed policy rules.52 Results for the Nash
52More formally, (i) the single monetary authority chooses φpi, which gives the reaction function Φpi (γ, γ
∗)
where Φpi = arg max
φpi
W (φpi|γ, γ∗), (ii) the domestic country’s government chooses γ, which gives the reaction
function Γ (φpi, γ
∗) where Γ = arg max
γ
V (γ|φpi, γ∗), and (iii) the foreign country’s government chooses γ∗, which
gives the reaction function, Γ∗ (φpi, γ) where Γ
∗ = arg max
γ∗
W (γ∗|φpi, γ). In doing so, all three policy authorities
are constrained by the world equilibrium system which was for given policy feedbacks. The Nash numerical
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policy game, using the same parameterization as above, are reported in Table 14. Numbers
in parentheses report welfare levels in the benchmark case with cooperation summarized by
Table 5, other things equal. Welfare gains/losses of Nash vis-a-vis cooperation are in terms of
percentage consumption equivalents; a negative number means a loss vis-a-vis the case with
cooperation and vice versa with a positive number.
Table 14: Nash versus cooperative policies
(without premia in the reformed steady state)
2 periods 4 periods 20 periods lifetime
Domestic (Germany)
0.1356
(0.1424)
0.2673
(0.2751)
1.0507
(1.0543)
2.8785
(2.8979)
welfare gain/loss -0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0002 -0.0003
Foreign (Italy)
−0.0353
(−0.0421)
−0.0110
(−0.0099)
0.4694
(0.4585)
2.7541
(2.765)
welfare gain/loss 0.0023 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0002
Notes: (i) Optimized policy coefficients under Nash φpi = 1.1, γ
g
l = 0.1011, γ
∗g
l = 0.4344,
γnl = 0.0211, γ
∗n
l = 0.0218, γ
l
l = γ
∗l
l = γ
c
l = γ
∗c
l = γ
k
l = γ
∗k
l = 0 and ρ
β∗ = 0.
(ii) We set η ≡ 0.5 in the bank’s problem. (iii) Results with cooperation in parentheses. (iv) Welfare
gains/losses in terms of consumption equivalents.
Our solution implies that cooperation is superior to Nash in terms of lifetime utility and
this is the case in each country. That is, cooperation is Pareto efficient eventually. On the
other hand, the effects of cooperation are very small in magnitude in terms of consumption
equivalents. These results are consistent with those delivered by similar models (see e.g.
Mendoza and Tesar, 2005).53 What we think is novel here is that, when fiscal policies are set
non-cooperatively, Italy finds it optimal to react less to its debt imbalances than in the case
in which the same policies are set jointly (γ∗gl = 0.4344 in the Nash equilibrium in Table 14 is
less than γ∗gl = 0.5619 which was the case in Table 5 in the cooperative solution). Intuitively,
solution, i.e. the values of the time-invariant φpi, γ and γ
∗, is then given by the point of intersection of the three
reaction functions.
53Okano (2014), on the other hand, finds zero gains from cooperation in the absence of utility-enhancing
government consumption services (in our model, this happens when χg = 0). We report that here we continue
to get welfare differences (although very small in magnitude) between Nash and cooperation even when we set
χg = 0. This is not surprising. Okano (2014), as well as Beetsma and Jensen (2005), work with different models,
which do not include, for instance, capital accumulation or distorting taxes, so they have a smaller menu of
international externalities than we have here (for instance, here, as well as in Mendoza and Tesar, 2005, there
are also externalities coming from national tax policies, which affect saving, investment, consumption and labor
supply in both countries).
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since debt consolidation in one country works like an international public good (see e.g. the
discussion in subsection 5.3 above), individual countries have an incentive to go for a milder
debt consolidation in the absence of international cooperation or, equivalently, each country
has an incentive to free ride on other countries’ debt consolidation measures. Also notice that,
without cooperation, the two countries need to use labor taxes too for debt consolidation,
which can be explained by the fact that labor is an internationally immobile factor in our
model.
7.2 Would monetary policy independence matter?
Finally, we resolve the model under the counter-factual scenario of flexible exchange rates and
hence independent monetary policies in the two countries. In terms of modelling, the difference
from the currency union model solved so far is that now the exchange rate between the two
countries, St, becomes an endogenous variable. Thus, St and R
∗
t exchange places: the latter
was endogenous in the currency union regime studied so far (see the discussion in subsection
2.6.1), while now it is the former that becomes endogenous with the latter being free to follow,
for instance, a national Taylor-type rule. In other words, with flexible exchange rates, we can
have an independent Taylor-type rule for the national nominal interest rate in each country.
Here, we postulate the rules:
log
(
Rt
R
)
= φpi log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ φy log
(
yHt
yH
)
+φ log
(t

)
(33)
log
(
R∗t
R∗
)
= φ∗pi log
(
Π∗t
Π∗
)
+ φ∗y log
(
y∗Ht
y∗H
)
+ φ∗ log
(t

)
(34)
where φpi, φy, φ, φ
∗
pi, φ
∗
y, φ
∗
 ≥ 0 are respectively feedback monetary policy coefficients on
inflation, output and exchange rate changes in each country (recall that t ≡ St/St−1). As
above, for simple computational reasons (recall subsection 6.2), we will switch off the reaction
to the output gap in the optimized policy rules. But now there are some differences. First,
in (33)-(34), we also allow for reaction to exchange rate changes following e.g. Benigno et al.
(2007). Also, as already said in subsection 4.3.2 above, now, if we want to ensure that the ZLB
is not violated, we need to restrict the range of feedback coeffcients in the national monetary
policy rules, φpi, φ, φ
∗
pi, φ
∗
 , so as Rt, Qt, R
∗
t , Q
∗
t > 1 (see at the end of this subsection for
details). Thus, the results presented below will be constrained by the ZLB.
Since money is neutral in a steady state with zero inflation, the exchange rate regime
does not affect the real allocation in the steady state solution, nor the calibration stage. Thus,
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possible differences would appear along the transition only. Using the same parameterization as
above, results under flexible exchange rates are reported in Table 15. Numbers in parentheses
report welfare levels in the benchmark case of a currency union as summarized in Table 5, other
things equal. Welfare gains/losses are again in terms of percentage consumption equivalents;
a positive number means a gain vis-a-vis the case of a currency union and vice versa with a
negative number.
Table 15: Flexible exchange rates versus a currency union
(without premia in the reformed steady state)
2 periods 4 periods 20 periods lifetime
Home (Germany)
0.1247
(0.1424)
0.2457
(0.2751)
1.0615
(1.0543)
3.053
(2.8979)
welfare gain/loss -0.006 -0.0061 0.0004 0.0026
Foreign (Italy)
−0.0404
(−0.0421)
−0.0291
(−0.0099)
0.4479
(0.4585)
2.9163
(2.765)
welfare gain/loss 0.0006 -0.004 -0.0006 0.0033
Notes: (i) Optimized policy coefficients under flexible exchange rates φpi = 1.2, φ
∗
pi = 1.9695,
φ = 1.025 , φ
∗
 = 6.47, γ
g
l = 0.0829, γ
∗g
l = 0.5583, γ
l
l = γ
∗l
l = γ
c
l = γ
k
l = γ
n
l = 0,
γ∗cl = γ
∗k
l = γ
∗n
l = 0 and ρ
β∗ = 0 (ii) We set η ≡ 0.5 (iii) Results in a currency union regime in
parentheses. (iv) Welfare gains/losses are in terms of consumption equivalents.
The results reveal that a switch to flexible exchange rate could be beneficial in terms of
lifetime utility in each country (simply because policymakers can now use more instruments),
although the gains are small in both countries in terms of consumption equivalents. This is
a typical result in this family of New Keynesian models (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe,
2016, who also review the related literature). Obviously, the arguments for monetary policy
independence are expected to become even weaker, had we included policy credibility problems
that naturally arise in the case of independent monetary policies (made possible by flexible
exchange rate regimes) in inflation-prone countries like Italy. But, keeping these caveats in
mind, the main messages do not change; for instance, the magnitude of most fiscal feedback
policy coefficients remains close to that in Table 5, which again means that fiscal consolidation
should take place via government consumption spending cuts. On the other hand, there are
some new results for monetary policy. For instance, the optimal reaction of national policy
interest rates to inflation, φpi and φ
∗
pi, is higher than in the currency union regime with a single
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policy interest rate (this is discussed in the next paragraph). Also, observe that the optimal
reaction to exchange rate changes is relatively high in both countries, and especially in Italy
(see the optimized value of φ∗ ), meaning that active intervention in the foreign exchange rate
is desirable.
We close this regime with some results coming from the response functions (available in
Appendix 9). As a consequence of debt consolidation in Italy, nominal interest rates, as well
as inflation rates, fall by more under flexible exchange rates than in a currency union and
this happens in both countries; as Erceg and Linde´ (2013) explain, the single currency-union
central bank provides relatively little accommodation given its focus on union-wide averages.54
Our response functions also show that, in the debt consolidating country, the real interest
rate is lower in a currency union than under flexible exchange rates, which induces a stronger
crowding-in of capital and eventually a higher output over time; only, on impact, output is
higher under flexible exchange rates in Italy. Recall that all this is with optimized policy rules.
8 Conclusions, discussion of policy and extensions
This paper has studied fiscal and monetary policy in a New Keynesian model consisting of two
heterogeneous countries being part of a monetary union. We have used simple, implementable
and optimized feedback policy rules for all main categories of taxes and public spending, as
well as for the union-wide nominal interest rate, in order to study the general equilibrium
implications of fiscal consolidation in a high-debt member country. A general result is that
the fiscal policy mix is important for both countries. Another main result is that, although
there is a conflict of national interests in shorter horizons, there is a common interest in the
medium and longer term. This is with optimized policy rules. By contrast, debt consolidation
is welfare inferior to non-consolidation for both countries and all the time, if it is implemented
in an ad hoc way, like an increase in income taxes.
Regarding the way of modelling policy, here we adopted a rules-based approach. That
is, we assumed that policy instruments follow simple, implementable and optimized policy
rules, which means that their values deviate optimally from their trend values, where these
54Under independent monetary policies, national central banks have extra incentives to go for cuts in their
policy rates (for instance, other things equal, an interest rate cut results in exchange rate depreciation that
may improve competitiveness). In our model, this implies that if the optimal choice of φpi, φ, φ
∗
pi, φ
∗
 is left
unconstrained, the policy nominal interest rates have a tendency to violate their ZLB. In the results reported
here, we have imposed restrictions upon the range of φpi, φ, φ
∗
pi, φ
∗
 so this does not happen. Nevertheless, we
report that our main normative results do not depend on whether we force the computations to respect the
ZLB or not. See e.g. Erceg and Linde´ (2013) for a detailed study of monetary policy, both constrained and
unconstrained by the ZLB, in a currency union and under flexible exchange rates.
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trend values are set to the data averages. We realize that there are alternative approaches
to modelling policy. They include Ramsey-Chamley-Judd type of policy (meaning completely
optimal policy rules), Markov-perfect policy (meaning optimal policy in the absence of rules),
or the type of policy pioneered by Mirrlees (1971) and extended more recently by the so-called
New Dynamic Public Finance policy (meaning models of optimal taxation under asymmetric
information). Here, in accordance with most of the related literature on debt consolidation (see
the Introductory section above), we focused on optimized rules. We believe that this approach
to policy can be justified given the institutional and political constraints that usually do not
allow for a fully optimal policy, especially fiscal policy (see also Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe,
2005, and Kirsanova et al., 2007).
This work can be extended in several ways. Distributional implications of debt consoli-
dation, like those mentioned in subsection 6.5, can be studied in more detail and by using
other forms of agent heterogeneity. Also, we could add extra types of cross-border effects,
like international public goods/bads and labor mobility (migration) and then reevaluate the
possible benefits of international cooperation. We leave these extensions for future work.
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9 Appendix 1: Households
This Appendix presents the solution of the household’s problem in the domestic country (the
problem of the household in the foreign country is analogous except otherwise said). In each
country, there are i = 1, 2, ..., .N identical households who act competitively.
9.1 Household’s optimality conditions
Each domestic household i maximizes (7)-(8) subject to (1)-(6), (9)-(10) in the main text. The
first-order conditions include the constraints plus:
∂ui,t
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t )
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ki,t+1
ki,t
+
(
1− τkt+1
)
rkt+1
 (37)
χm
∂ui,t
∂mi.t
=
∂ui,t
∂ci,t
∂ci,t
∂cHi,t
Pt
PHt (1 + τ
c
t)
− βEt∂ui,t+1
∂ci,t+1
∂ci,t+1
∂cHi,t+1
Pt+1
PHt+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) Pt
Pt+1
(38)
−χn
∂ui,t
∂ni,t
=
(1− τnt )
(1 + τ ct)
wt
∂ui,t
∂ci,t
∂ci,t
∂cHi,t
Pt
PHt
(39)
cHi,t
cFi,t
=
ν
1− ν
PFt
PHt
(40)
cHi,t(h) =
[
PHt (h)
PHt
]−φ
cHi,t (41)
cFi,t(f) =
[
PFt (f)
PFt
]−φ
cFi,t (42)
Equations (35)-(37) are respectively the Euler equations for domestic government bonds,
foreign assets and domestic capital, (38) is the optimality condition for money balances and
(39) is the optimality condition for work hours. Finally, (40) shows the optimal allocation
between domestic goods h and foreign goods f , while (41) and (42) show the optimal demand
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for each variety of domestic and foreign goods respectively.
9.2 Implications for price bundles
Equations (40), (41) and (42), combined with the household’s budget constraints, imply that
the three price indexes are:
Pt = (P
H
t )
ν(PFt )
1−ν (43)
PHt =
[
N∑
h=1
[PHt (h)]
1−φ
] 1
1−φ
(44)
PFt =
[
N∑
f=1
[PFt (f)]
1−φ
] 1
1−φ
(45)
10 Appendix 2: Firms
This Appendix presents the solution of the firm’s problem in the domestic country (the problem
of the firm in the foreign country is analogous except otherwise said). There are h = 1, 2, ..., .N
domestic firms. Each firm h produces a differentiated good of variety h under monopolistic
competition facing Calvo-type nominal fixities.
10.1 Demand for the firm’s product
Each domestic firm h faces demand for its product, yHt (h). The latter comes from domes-
tic households’ private consumption and investment, CHt (h) and Xt(h), where C
H
t (h) ≡∑N
i=1 c
H
i,t(h) and Xt(h) ≡
∑N
i=1 xi,t(h), from the domestic government, denoted as Gt (h),
from the financial intermediary which is located in the domestic country, denoted as Υt(h),
55
and from foreign households’ consumption of the domestic good, CF∗t (h), where CF∗t (h) ≡∑N∗
i=1 c
F∗
i,t (h). Thus, aggregate demand for each good h is:
yHt (h) = C
H
t (h) +Xt(h) +Gt (h) + Υt(h) + C
F∗
t (h) (46)
55That is, as in e.g. Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010 and 2011), any resources consumed by the bank for the
monitoring of its financial operations will be part of the aggregate demand for the Dixit-Stiglitz composite good.
The bank uses real resources in the period in which the loan is originated; see below for further details.
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Since we have:
cHi,t(h) =
[
PHt (h)
PHt
]−φ
cHi,t (47)
xi,t (h) =
[
PHt (h)
PHt
]−φ
xi,t (48)
Gt (h) =
[
PHt (h)
PHt
]−φ
Gt (49)
Υt(h) =
[
PHt (h)
PHt
]−φ
Υt (50)
cF∗i,t (h) =
[
PF∗t (h)
PF∗t
]−φ
cF∗i,t (51)
we can rewrite it as:
yHt (h) =
[
PHt (h)
PHt
]−φ
[CHt +Xt +Gt + Υt + C
F∗
t ] (52)
where CHt ≡
∑N
i=1 c
H
i,t is total private consumption of home goods, Xt ≡
∑N
i=1 xi,t is total
private investment, CF∗t ≡
∑N∗
i=1 c
F∗
i,t is total private consumption of home goods by households
in the foreign country (i.e. domestic country’s exports), Gt denotes total government purchases
of domestic output and Υt denotes total resources consumed by the financial intermediary. Also
notice that the law of one price implies that in (51):
PF∗t (h)
PF∗t
=
PHt (h)
St
PHt
St
=
PHt (h)
PHt
(53)
Since aggregate demand, Y Ht , is (see also Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2007):
Y Ht = C
H
t +Xt +Gt + Υt + C
F∗
t (54)
61
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
aggregate demand for each good h is rewritten as:
yHt (h) =
[
PHt (h)
PHt
]−φ
Y Ht (55)
10.2 Firm’s problem
As said in the main text, each domestic firm h maximizes real profits:
ω˜t(h) ≡ P
H
t (h)
Pt
yHt (h)−
PHt
Pt
rkt kt−1(h)− wtnt(h) (56)
where the maximization is subject to the production function:
yHt (h) = At[kt−1(h)]
α[nt(h)]
1−α (57)
and the demand function for each h’s product as derived above:
yHt (h) =
[
PHt (h)
PHt
]−φ
Y Ht (58)
As said in the text, firms choose their prices facing a nominal fixity. In each period, firm h
faces an exogenous probability θ of not being able to reset its price. A firm h, which is able to
reset its price, chooses its price P#t (h) to maximize the sum of discounted expected nominal
profits for the next k periods in which it may have to keep its price fixed.
10.3 Firm’s optimality conditions
To solve the firm’s problem, following most of the related literature, we work in two steps.
We first solve a cost minimization problem, where each firm h minimizes its cost by choosing
factor inputs given technology and prices. In turn, given this cost function, each firm, if it is
able to reset its price, solves a maximization problem by choosing its price.
The cost mimimization problem (written in real terms) is:
rkt
PHt
Pt
kt−1(h) + wtnt(h) +mct(h)
[
yt (h)−At[kt−1(h)]α[nt(h)]1−α
]
(59)
where the production level, yt (h), is taken as given and mct(h) denotes the real marginal cost
or, equivalently, the multiplier associated with the production level.
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The solution gives the input demand functions:
wt = mct(h)(1− a)At[kt−1(h)]α[nt(h)]−α (60)
PHt
Pt
rkt = mct(h)aAt[kt−1(h)]
α−1[nt(h)]1−α (61)
where, in equilibrium, with constant returns to scale to private inputs, the firm’s marginal cost
and the capital-to-labor ratio will not depend on firm-specific variables (see also Yun, 1996,
and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2007).
In turn, the firm chooses its price, P#t (h), to maximize the expected sum of discounted
nominal profits:
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkΞt,t+k
{
P#t (h) y
H
t+k (h)−Ψt+k
(
yHt+k (h)
)}
where Ξt,t+k is a discount factor taken as given by the firm and defined below, y
H
t+k (h) =[
P#t (h)
PHt+k
]−φ
Y Ht+k is the demand function and Ψt(h) denotes the minimum nominal cost function
for producing yHt (h) at t so that Ψ
′
t(h) is the associated marginal cost (Ψ
′
t(h) =mct(h)Pt).
The first-order condition for P#t (h) gives (see also e.g. Gal´ı (2008, p. 44):
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkΞt,t+k
[
P#t (h)
PHt+k
]−φ
Y Ht+k
{
P#t (h)−
φ
φ− 1Ψ
′
t+k(h)
}
= 0 (62)
or, dividing by the price index, PHt , we have:
Et
∞∑
k=0
θk[Ξt,t+k
[
P#t (h)
PHt+k
]−φ
Y Ht+k
{
P#t (h)
PHt
− φ
φ− 1mct+k(h)
Pt+k
PHt
}
] = 0 (63)
Therefore, the behaviour of each firm h is summarized by (60), (61) and (63). A recursive
expression of this problem is presented below.
Note that each firm h, which can reset its price in period t, solves an identical problem,
so P#t (h) = P
#
t is independent of h, and each firm h, which cannot reset its price, just sets
its previous period price PHt (h) = P
H
t−1 (h) . Thus, the evolution of the aggregate price level is
given by (see also e.g. Gal´ı (2008, p. 62)):
(
PHt
)1−φ
= θ
(
PHt−1
)1−φ
+ (1− θ)
(
P#t
)1−φ
(64)
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11 Appendix 3: Government budget constraint
This Appendix presents the government budget constraint in some detail. We start by pre-
senting the domestic government’s budget constraint in nominal and aggregate terms:
Bt + StF
g
t +Mt = Rt−1Bt−1 +Qt−1StF
g
t−1 +Mt−1+
+PHt Gt − τ ct(PHt CHt + PFt CFt )− τkt (rkt PHt Kt−1 + PtΩ˜t)− τntWtN˜t − T lt
(65)
where Bt is the end-of-period nominal public debt held by domestic agents, F
g
t is the end-of-
period nominal public debt held by foreign agents and expressed in foreign currency, Mt is
the end-of-period stock of nominal money balances, CHt ≡
∑N
i=1 c
H
i,t, C
F
t ≡
∑N
i=1 c
F
i,t, Kt−1 ≡∑N
i=1 ki,t−1, Ω˜t ≡
∑N
i=1 ω˜i,t, N˜t ≡
∑N
i=1 ni,t and T
l
t denotes the nomimal value of lump-sum
taxes/transfers to households (the rest of the variables have been defined above).
Then, dividing by the current CPI, Pt, and the constant population size, N , we get the
government budget constraint in real and per capita terms:
bt +
StP ∗t
Pt
fgt +mt = Rt−1
Pt−1
Pt
bt−1 +Qt−1
StP ∗t
Pt
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
fgt−1 +
Pt−1
Pt
mt−1+
+
PHt
Pt
gt − τ ct(P
H
t
Pt
cHt +
PFt
Pt
cFt )− τkt (rkt P
H
t
Pt
kt−1 + ω˜t)− τnt wtnt − τ lt
(66)
where small letters denote real and per capita quantities, namely, bt ≡ BtPtN , f
g
t ≡ F
g
t
P ∗t N
,
mt ≡ MtPtN , gt ≡ GtN , cHt ≡
CHt
N , c
F
t ≡ C
F
t
N , kt−1 ≡ Kt−1N , ω˜t ≡ Ω˜tN , nt ≡ N˜tN and where τ lt ≡ T
l
t
PtN
denotes the lump-sum real tax/transfer given to each household (see the household’s budget
constraint).
For convenience, let Dt ≡ Bt + StF gt denote the total nominal public debt issued by the
domestic government. This debt can be held by domestic private agents, λtDt, and by foreign
private agents, StF
g
t = (1− λt)Dt, where 0 ≤ λt ≤ 1. Then, the above government budget
constraint is rewritten as:
dt +mt = Rt−1λt−1
Pt−1
Pt
dt−1 +
Pt−1
Pt
mt−1+
+Qt−1
StP ∗t
Pt
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
Pt−1
P ∗t−1St−1
(1− λt−1) dt−1 + P
H
t
Pt
gt − τ ct(P
H
t
Pt
cHt +
PFt
Pt
cFt )
−τkt (rkt P
H
t
Pt
kt−1 + ω˜t)− τnt wtnt − τ lt
(67)
Thus, the liabilities of the domestic government as a share of output are (expressed in real
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and per capita terms):
lt ≡
Rtλtdt +Qt
St+1
St
(1− λt) dt
PHt
Pt
yHt
(68)
Similarly, the government budget constraint in real and per capita terms in the foreign
country is:
b∗t +
Pt
P ∗t St
f∗gt +m∗t = R∗t−1
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
b∗t−1 +Q∗t−1
Pt
P ∗t St
Pt−1
Pt
f∗gt−1 +
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
m∗t−1+
+
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
g∗t − τ∗ct (P
∗H
t
P ∗t
c∗Ht +
P ∗Ft
P ∗t
c∗Ft )− τ∗kt (r∗kt P
∗H
t
P ∗t
k∗t−1 + ω˜
∗
t )− τ∗nt w∗t n∗t − τ∗lt
(69)
Let denote D∗t to be the total foreign public debt in foreign currency. This can be held by
foreign private agents, B∗t = λ
∗
tD
∗
t , and by domestic private agents,
F ∗gt
St
= (1− λ∗t )D∗t . Then,
we have:
d∗t +m∗t = R∗t−1λ
∗
t−1
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
d∗t−1 +
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
m∗t−1+
+Q∗t−1
Pt
P ∗t St
Pt−1
Pt
St−1P ∗t−1
Pt−1 (1− λ∗t−1)d∗t−1 +
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
g∗t − τ∗ct (P
∗H
t
P ∗t
c∗Ht +
P ∗Ft
P ∗t
c∗Ft )−
−τ∗kt (r∗kt P
∗H
t
P ∗t
k∗t−1 + ω˜
∗
t )− τ∗nt w∗t n∗t − τ∗lt
(70)
Thus, the liabilities of the foreign government as a share of output are (expressed in real
and per capita terms):
l∗t ≡
R∗tλ
∗
td
∗
t +Q
∗
t
St
St+1
(1− λ∗t ) d∗t
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
y∗Ht
(71)
12 Appendix 4: Financial intermediary
The profit of the international financial intermediary from loans between t − 1 and t is dis-
tributed at time t. In nominal and aggregate terms, this profit is defined as:56
Q∗t−1
[
(F ∗gt−1 − F ∗ht−1)− PHt−1
ψ
2
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)2N
]
−Qt−1St
(
F ht−1 − F gt−1
)
(72)
56Thus, at the beginning of period t, agents carry over assets and liabilities from period t−1. Borrowers honor
their preexisting obligations to lenders. In particular, in the international capital market, where transactions
take place via the bank, the bank receives interest income from borrowers and pays off the lenders. The latter
is the interest payments that the bank promised at t − 1 to pay at t. The bank also pays the monitoring cost
associated with these transactions.
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where F ht−1 ≡
∑N
i=1 F
h
i,t−1 and F
∗h
t−1 ≡
∑N∗
i=1 F
∗h
i,t−1 are aggregate nominal international assets
held by private agents in the domestic and foreign country respectively, F gt−1 and F
∗g
t−1 are
aggregate nominal foreign public debt in the domestic and foreign country respectively (see
also Appendix 3 above), and ψ2 (f
∗g
t−1 − f∗ht−1)2 is a per capita real cost function, where f∗gt−1
and f∗ht−1 are respectively per capita and real foreign public debt and foreign private assets
respectively and ψ ≥ 0 is a cost parameter. That is, at any t, fgt ≡ F
g
t
P ∗t N
and fht ≡
∑N
i=1 f
h
i,t
N ,
where fhi,t ≡
Fhi,t
P ∗t
, and analogously for f∗gt and f∗ht . Then, if (F ht−1 − F gt−1) is positive (resp.
negative), it denotes the net asset (resp. liability) position of the domestic country in the
world financial market, and similarly for (F ∗ht−1 − F ∗gt−1) in the foreign country. Notice that the
real resources used by the bank are assumed to be consumed at the same time the interest
payments/income are repaid/received, namely at time t, rather then when the loan contract
was originated, namely at time t− 1.
Then, dividing by the current CPI, Pt, and the constant population size, N , the real and
per capita profit, defined as pit, becomes:
pit ≡ Q∗t−1
[
Pt−1
Pt
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)−
PHt
Pt
ψ
2
PHt−1
PHt
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)2
]
−Qt−1StP
∗
t
Pt
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
(
fht−1 − fgt−1
)
(73)
Since, in equilibrium, international borrowing equals international lending at each t, namely,
F ∗gt − F ∗ht = St
(
F ht − F gt
)
in nominal and aggregate terms, or f∗gt − f∗ht = StP
∗
t
Pt
(
fht − fgt
)
in
real and per capita terms, so that f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1 =
St−1P ∗t−1
Pt−1
(
fht−1 − fgt−1
)
, this is rewritten as:
pit = Q
∗
t−1
[
Pt−1
Pt
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)−
PHt
Pt
ψ
2
PHt−1
PHt
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)2
]
−Qt−1 St
St−1
Pt−1
Pt
(f∗gt−1−f∗ht−1) (74)
If the volume of the loan, (f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1), is chosen optimally by the financial intermediary,
the first-order condition is:
Q∗t−1 =
Qt−1 StSt−1
1− P
H
t−1
Pt−1ψ(f
∗g
t−1 − f∗ht−1)
(75)
In what follows, we define Q∗t−1
ψ
2
PHt−1
PHt
(f∗gt−1−f∗ht−1)2 ≡ υt, where recall from above the GDP
identity Y Ht = C
H
t +Xt+Gt+Υt+C
F∗
t in total terms or, equivalently, y
H
t = c
H
t +xt+gt+υt+c
F∗
t
in per capita terms. Recall that St = 1 in a currency union regime.
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13 Appendix 5: Equilibrium in the status quo economy
This Appendix presents in detail the status quo equilibrium system, given feedback policy
coefficients. We will work in steps.
13.1 Market-clearing conditions and the balance of payments
In the domestic economy, the market-clearing conditions in the capital market, the labor
market, the money market, the domestic government bond market and the domestic dividend
market are respectively (and similarly in the foreign country):
N∑
i=1
ki,t−1 =
N∑
h=1
kt−1(h) (76)
N∑
i=1
ni,t =
N∑
h=1
nt(h) (77)
N∑
i=1
mi,t =
Mt
Pt
(78)
N∑
i=1
bi,t =
Bt
Pt
(79)
N∑
i=1
ω˜i,t =
N∑
i=1
ω˜t(h) (80)
The market-clearing condition for the profits made by the international financial interme-
diary (these profits are distributed to households in the domestic economy only who also bear
the associated costs) is:
N∑
i=1
pii,t = Npit (81)
Regarding the balance of payments in each country, this is obtained by adding the con-
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straints of households, firms and the government in the country. Then, the balance of payments
in the domestic country (written in real and per capita terms) is:
PHt
Pt
(cHt + xt + gt) +
PFt
Pt
cFt +Qt−1
StP ∗t
Pt
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
(
fgt−1 − fht−1
)
=
=
StP ∗t
Pt
(
fgt − fht
)
+ pit +
∑N
h=1 P
H
t (h)y
H
t (h)
NPt
(82)
where are variables have been defined above already.
It can be shown, by using the demand function for each firm’s product, yHt (h) =
[
PHt (h)
PHt
]−φ
Y Ht ,
and the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation formula for aggregate absorption, Y Ht ≡
[
N∑
h=1
[yHt (h)]
φ−1
φ
] φ
φ−1
,
that
∑N
h=1 P
H
t (h)y
H
t (h) = P
H
t Y
H
t . Hence, the last term on the RHS of the balance of payments
above is
PHt
Pt
yHt , where y
H
t ≡ Y
H
t
N is per capita domestic absorption. Therefore, the balance of
payments in the domestic economy is:
PHt
Pt
(cHt + xt + gt − yHt ) + P
F
t
Pt
cFt +Qt−1
StP ∗t
Pt
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
(
fgt−1 − fht−1
)
=
=
StP ∗t
Pt
(
fgt − fht
)
+ pit
(83)
where recall that the resources used by the financial intermediary, υt ≡ Q∗t−1 ψ2
PHt−1
PHt
(f∗gt−1 −
f∗ht−1)2, are paid by the domestic country (see Appendix 4), so that yHt = cHt +xt+gt+υt+cF∗t
(see also Appendix 2) and where (from Appendix 4) pit ≡ Q∗t−1 Pt−1Pt (f
∗g
t−1 − f∗ht−1) − P
H
t
Pt
υt −
Qt−1
StP ∗t
Pt
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
(
fht−1 − fgt−1
)
. If, in turn, we add
PHt
Pt
υt on both sides of the balance of payments
above, we have
PHt
Pt
(cHt + xt + gt + υt − yHt ) = −P
H
t
Pt
cF∗t so that the terms −P
H
t
Pt
cF∗t +
PFt
Pt
cFt on
the LHS is the trade balance.
Working similalry, we get the balance of payments in the foreign country:
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
(c∗Ht + x∗t + g∗t − y∗Ht ) + P
∗F
t
P ∗t
c∗Ft +Q∗t−1
Pt
StP ∗t
Pt−1
Pt
(
f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1
)
=
= PtStP ∗t
(
f∗gt − f∗ht
) (84)
where now y∗Ht = c∗Ht + x∗t + g∗t + cFt .
Finally, as also said in Appendix 4 above, the market-clearing condition in the market of
internationally traded assets is (written in real and per capita terms):
(
f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1
)
=
StP
∗
t
Pt
(
fht−1 − fgt−1
)
(85)
which means that net foreign liabilities in the foreign country (the LHS) are equal to net foreign
assets in the domectic country (the RHS).
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13.2 Equilibrium equations
Given the above, equilibrium in the home country is summarized by the following equations
(we omit the expectations operator in what follows):
∂ut
∂ct
∂ct
∂cHt
Pt
PHt (1 + τ
c
t)
= β
∂ut+1
∂ct+1
∂ct+1
∂cHt+1
Pt+1
PHt+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)Rt Pt
Pt+1
(86)
∂ut
∂ct
∂ct
∂cHt
1
(1+τct )
Pt
PHt
StP ∗t
Pt
=
= β ∂ut+1∂ct+1
∂ct+1
∂cHt+1
1
(1+τct+1)
Pt+1
PHt+1
Qt
St+1P ∗t+1
Pt+1
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
(87)
∂ut
∂ct
∂ct
∂cHt
1
(1+τct )
{
1 + ξ
(
kt
kt−1 − 1
)}
=
= β ∂ut+1∂ct+1
∂ct+1
∂cHt+1
1
(1+τct+1)
{
(1− δ)− ξ2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
+ ξ
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)
kt+1
kt
+
(
1− τkt+1
)
rkt+1
}
(88)
∂ut
∂mt
=
∂ut
∂ct
∂ct
∂cHt
Pt
PHt (1 + τ
c
t)
− β∂ut+1
∂ct+1
∂ct+1
∂cHt+1
Pt+1
PHt+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) Pt
Pt+1
(89)
−∂ut
∂nt
= (1− τnt )wt
∂ut
∂ct
∂ct
∂cHt
Pt
PHt (1 + τ
c
t)
(90)
cHt
cFt
=
ν
1− ν
PFt
PHt
(91)
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + xt − ξ
2
(
kt
kt−1
− 1
)2
kt−1 (92)
ct =
(
cHt
)ν (
cFt
)1−ν
νν(1− ν)1−ν (93)
wt = mct(1− a)Atkat−1n−at (94)
PHt
Pt
rkt = mctaAtk
a−1
t−1 n
1−a
t (95)
ω˜t =
PHt
Pt
yHt −
PHt
Pt
rkt kt−1 − wtnt (96)
∞∑
k=0
θkΞt,t+k
[
P#t
PHt+k
]−φ
yHt+k
{
P#t
PHt
PHt
Pt
Pt
Pt−1
− φ
(φ− 1)mct+k
Pt
Pt−1
...
Pt+k
Pt+k−1
}
= 0 (97)
yHt =
1(
P˜Ht
PHt
)−φAtkat−1n1−at (98)
bt +mt +
StP ∗t
Pt
fgt =
Rt−1bt−1
Πt
+ mt−1Πt +Qt−1
StP ∗t
Pt
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
fgt−1+
+
PHt
Pt
gt − τ ct(P
H
t
Pt
cHt +
PFt
Pt
cFt )− τkt (rkt P
H
t
Pt
kt−1 + ω˜t)− τnt wtnt − τ lt
(99)
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yHt = c
H
t + xt + gt + υt + c
F∗
t (100)
PHt
Pt
(cHt + xt + gt − yHt ) + P
F
t
Pt
cFt +Qt−1
StP ∗t
Pt
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
(
fgt−1 − fht−1
)
=
=
StP ∗t
Pt
(
fgt − fht
)
+ pit
(101)
(
PHt
)1−φ
=
[
θ
(
PHt−1
)1−φ
+ (1− θ)
(
P#t
)1−φ]
(102)
Pt = (P
H
t )
ν(PFt )
1−ν (103)
PFt = StP
H∗
t (104)
P ∗t = (P
∗H
t )
ν∗(PHt /St)
1−ν∗ (105)(
P˜Ht
)−φ
=
[
θ
(
P˜Ht−1
)−φ
+ (1− θ)
(
P#t
)−φ]
(106)
υt ≡ Q∗t−1
ψ
2
PHt−1
PHt
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)2 (107)
pit ≡ Q∗t−1
[
Pt−1
Pt
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)−
PHt
Pt
ψ
2
PHt−1
PHt
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)2
]
−Qt−1 St
St−1
Pt−1
Pt
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)
(108)
Q∗t−1 =
Qt−1 StSt−1
1− P
H
t−1
Pt−1ψ(f
∗g
t−1 − f∗ht−1)
(109)
where Ξt,t+k ≡ βk c
−σ
t+k
c−σt
Pt
Pt+k
τct
τct+k
is the firm’s discount rate, St ≡ 1 in a currency union model
and
PHt
Pt
=
(
PHt
PFt
)1−ν
.
Notice that yHt =
1(
P˜Ht
PHt
)−φAtkat−1n1−at follows from the firm’s demand function yHt (h) =[
PHt (h)
PHt
]−φ
Y Ht . In particular, if we take the sum over all firms, we have
∑N
h=1 y
H
t (h) =
Y Ht
∑N
h=1
[
PHt (h)
PHt
]−φ
. Using the firm’s production function and since we have constant returns
to private inputs,
∑N
h=1 y
H
t (h) =
∑N
h=1At[kt−1(h)]
α[nt(h)]
1−α =
∑N
h=1At[
kt−1(h)
nt(h)
]αnt(h) =
At(Kt−1)α(Nt)1−α, where Kt−1 and Nt denote firms’ total capital and labor inputs. Also,
we define the auxiliary variable P˜Ht ≡
[
N∑
h=1
[PHt (h)]
−φ
]− 1
φ
. Using all this, we then have
At(Kt−1)α(Nt)1−α = Y Ht
(P˜Ht )
−φ
(PHt )
−φ or Y
H
t =
1(
P˜Ht
PHt
)−φAt(Kt−1)α(Nt)1−α, so that, by dividing
both sides by the population size, we have in per capita terms yHt =
1(
P˜Ht
PHt
)−φAtkat−1n1−at . See
also e.g. Yun (1996) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).
Working similarly, the foreign country is summarized by the following equations:
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∂u∗t
∂c∗t
∂c∗t
∂c∗Ht
P ∗t
P ∗Ht (1 + τ∗ct )
= β
∂u∗t+1
∂c∗t+1
∂c∗t+1
∂c∗Ht+1
P ∗t+1
P ∗Ht+1
(
1 + τ∗ct+1
)R∗t P ∗tP ∗t+1 (110)
∂u∗t
∂c∗t
∂c∗t
∂c∗Ht
P ∗t
P ∗Ht (1+τ∗ct )
Pt
StP ∗t
=
= β
∂u∗t+1
∂c∗t+1
∂c∗t+1
∂c∗Ht+1
P ∗t+1
P ∗Ht+1(1+τ∗ct+1)
Q∗t
Pt+1
St+1P ∗t+1
Pt
Pt+1
(111)
∂u∗t
∂c∗t
∂c∗t
∂c∗Ht
1
(1+τ∗ct )
{
1 + ξ∗
(
k∗t
k∗t−1
− 1
)}
=
= β
∂u∗t+1
∂c∗t+1
∂c∗t+1
∂c∗Ht+1
1
(1+τ∗ct+1)
{
(1− δ∗)− ξ∗2
(
k∗t+1
k∗t
− 1
)2
+ ξ∗
(
k∗t+1
k∗t
− 1
)
k∗t+1
k∗t
+
(
1− τ∗kt+1
)
r∗kt+1
}
(112)
∂u∗t
∂m∗t
=
∂u∗t
∂c∗t
∂c∗t
∂c∗Ht
P ∗t
P ∗Ht (1 + τ∗ct )
− β∂u
∗
t+1
∂c∗t+1
∂c∗t+1
∂c∗Ht+1
P ∗t+1
P ∗Ht+1
(
1 + τ∗ct+1
) P ∗t
P ∗t+1
(113)
−∂u
∗
t
∂n∗t
= (1− τ∗nt )wt
∂u∗t
∂c∗t
∂c∗t
∂cH∗t
P ∗t
P ∗Ht (1 + τ∗ct )
(114)
c∗Ht
c∗Ft
=
ν∗
1− ν∗
P ∗Ft
P ∗Ht
(115)
k∗t = (1− δ∗)k∗t−1 + x∗t −
ξ∗
2
(
k∗t
k∗t−1
− 1
)2
k∗t−1 (116)
c∗t =
(
c∗Ht
)ν∗ (
c∗Ft
)1−ν∗
ν∗ν∗(1− ν∗)1−ν∗ (117)
w∗t = mc
∗
t (1− a∗)A∗tk∗a
∗
t−1n
∗−a∗
t (118)
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
r∗kt = mc
∗
ta
∗A∗tk
∗a−1
t−1 n
∗1−a
t (119)
ω˜∗t =
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
y∗Ht −
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
r∗kt k
∗
t−1 − w∗t n∗t (120)
∞∑
k=0
(θ∗)k Ξ∗t,t+k
[
P ∗#t
P ∗Ht+k
]−φ
y∗Ht+k
{
P ∗#t
P ∗Ht
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
P ∗t
P ∗t−1
− φ
(φ− 1)mc
∗
t+k
P ∗t
P ∗t−1
...
P ∗t+k
P ∗t+k−1
}
= 0 (121)
yH∗t =
1(
P˜H∗t
PH∗t
)−φA∗tk∗a∗t−1n∗1−a∗t (122)
b∗t +m∗t +
Pt
StP ∗t
f∗gt = R∗t−1b∗t−1
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
+m∗t−1
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
+Q∗t−1
Pt
StP ∗t
Pt−1
Pt
f∗gt−1+
+
PH∗t
P ∗t
g∗t − τ∗ct (P ∗Ht c∗Ht + P ∗Ft c∗Ft )− τ∗kt (r∗kt P ∗Ht k∗t−1 + ω˜∗t )− τ∗nt w∗t n∗t − τ∗lt
(123)
y∗Ht = c
∗H
t + x
∗
t + g
∗
t + c
F
t (124)
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
(c∗Ht + x∗t + g∗t − y∗Ht ) + P
∗F
t
P ∗t
c∗Ft +Q∗t−1
Pt
StP ∗t
Pt−1
Pt
(
f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1
)
=
= PtStP ∗t
(
f∗gt − f∗ht
) (125)
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(
P ∗Ht
)1−φ∗
=
[
θ∗
(
P ∗Ht−1
)1−φ∗
+ (1− θ∗)
(
P ∗#t
)1−φ∗]
(126)
(
P˜ ∗Ht
)−φ∗
=
[
θ∗
(
P˜ ∗Ht−1
)−φ∗
+ (1− θ∗)
(
P ∗#t
)−φ∗]
(127)
where see below for number of equations and variables in this system.
13.3 Transformed variables
As in most of the related literature (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2005, 2007)), for
algebraic simplicity, we transform some variables and introduce some new ones.
First, instead of price levels, we work with inflation rates and relative prices. Thus, we define
Πt ≡ PtPt−1 , Π∗t ≡
P ∗t
P ∗t−1
,ΠHt ≡ P
H
t
PHt−1
, Θt ≡ P
#
t
PHt
, ∆t ≡
(
P˜Ht
PHt
)−φ
, t ≡ StSt−1 and TTt ≡
PFt
PHt
. We also
express some policy variables as shares of output. In particular, we define nominal domestic
public debt as a share, sbt , of total nominal output, so that per capita real domestic public debt
is bt ≡ BtPtN ≡
sbtP
H
t Y
H
t
PtN
≡ PHtPt sbtyHt = TT ν−1t sbtyHt , nominal total lump-sum taxes/transfers are
defined as a share, slt, of total nominal ouput, so that the per capita real lump-sum tax/transfer
is τ lt ≡ T
l
t
PtN
=
sltP
H
t Y
H
t
PtN
≡ PHtPt sltyHt = TT ν−1t sltyHt , while the quantity of goods/services provided
by the government is defined as a share, sgt , of total real output produced, so that the per capita
quantity of those goods/services is gt ≡ GtN ≡
sgt Y
H
t
N ≡ sgt yHt . So, in what follows, we will use
the variables Πt, Π
∗
t , Π
H
t , Θt, ∆t, t, TTt, s
g
t , s
l
t instead of Pt, P
∗
t , P
H
t , P
#
t , P˜t, St, P
F
t , gt, τ
l
t
respectively. Note that we also make use of the notation, fgt ≡ sft yHt 1TT ν∗t .
Second, working as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), we rewrite the firm’s optimality
conditions in recursive form. In particular, instead of equation (97), we now use:
z1t =
φ
(φ− 1)z
2
t (128)
where
z1t = Θ
1−φ
t y
H
t TT
ν−1
t + βθ
c−σt+1
c−σt
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
(
Θt
Θt+1
)1−φ( 1
ΠHt+1
)1−φ
z1t+1 (129)
z2t = Θ
−φ
t y
H
t mct + βθ
c−σt+1
c−σt
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
(
Θt
Θt+1
)−φ( 1
ΠHt+1
)−φ
z2t+1 (130)
thus, we add two more equations and two new endogenous variables, z1t and z
2
t .
Third, again as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), in order to compute expected dis-
counted lifetime utility, denoted as Vt, we add a new equation and a new endogenous variable,
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Vt (recall that gt ≡ sgt yHt ):
Vt =
c1−σt
1− σ − χn
n1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
+ χm
m1−µt
1− µ + χg
(
sgt y
H
t
)1−ζ
1− ζ + βVt+1 (131)
We work similarly for the foreign country. That is, first, we use Π∗Ht , Θ∗t , ∆∗t , s
∗g
t , s
∗l
t
instead of P ∗Ht , P
∗#
t , P˜
∗
t , g
∗
t , τ
∗l
t respectively, second, we have for the foreign firm:
z∗1t =
φ
(φ− 1)z
∗2
t (132)
z∗1t = Θ
∗1−φ∗
t y
∗H
t TT
1−ν∗
t + β
∗θ∗
c∗−σ
∗
t+1
c∗−σ∗t
1 + τ∗ct
1 + τ∗ct+1
(
Θ∗t
Θ∗t+1
)1−φ∗ ( 1
Π∗Ht+1
)1−φ∗
z∗1t+1 (133)
z∗2t = Θ
∗−φ∗
t y
∗H
t mc
∗
t + β
∗θ∗
c∗−σ
∗
t+1
c∗−σ∗t
1 + τ∗ct
1 + τ∗ct+1
(
Θ∗t
Θ∗t+1
)−φ∗ ( 1
Π∗Ht+1
)−φ∗
z∗2t+1 (134)
and, thirdly, we have the new value function:
V ∗t =
c∗1−σ
∗
t
1− σ∗ − χ
∗
n
n∗1+ϕ
∗
t
1 + ϕ∗
+ χ∗m
m∗1−µ
∗
t
1− µ∗ + χ
∗
g
(
s∗gt y∗Ht
)1−ζ∗
1− ζ∗ + βV
∗
t+1 (135)
Finally, given the above, notice that we make use of the following equations:
Pt
StP ∗t
= TT 1−ν−ν
∗
t
TTt =
PFt
PHt
=
PFt
St
PHt
St
=
P ∗Ht
P ∗Ft
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
=
P ∗Ht(
P ∗Ht
)ν∗ (
P ∗Ft
)1−ν∗ = (P ∗HtP ∗Ft
)1−ν∗
= TT 1−ν
∗
t
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P ∗Ft
P ∗t
=
P ∗Ft(
P ∗Ht
)ν∗ (
P ∗Ft
)1−ν∗ = (P ∗FtP ∗Ht
)ν∗
=
(
1
TTt
)ν∗
13.4 Final equilibrium system in the status quo economy
Using the above, we now present the final equilibrium system (given feedback policy coeffi-
cients).
The domestic country is summarized by the following equations:
Vt =
c1−σt
1− σ − χn
n1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
+ χm
m1−µt
1− µ + χg
(
sgt y
H
t
)1−ζ
1− ζ + βVt+1 (136)
β
c−σt+1(
1 + τ ct+1
) Rt
Πt+1
=
c−σt
(1 + τ ct)
(137)
β
c−σt+1(
1 + τ ct+1
)QtTT v∗+ν−1t+1
Π∗t+1
=
c−σt
(1 + τ ct)
TT v
∗+ν−1
t (138)
β
c−σt+1
(1+τct+1)
TT ν−1t+1
{
1− δ − ξ2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
+ ξ
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)
kt+1
kt
+
(
1− τkt+1
)
rkt+1
}
=
=
c−σt
(1+τct )
TT ν−1t
[
1 + ξ
(
kt
kt−1 − 1
)] (139)
χmm
−µ
t =
c−σt
(1 + τ ct)
− β c
−σ
t+1(
1 + τ ct+1
) 1
Πt+1
(140)
χnn
ϕ
t = (1− τnt )wt
c−σt
(1 + τ ct)
(141)
cHt
cFt
=
ν
1− ν TTt (142)
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + xt − ξ
2
(
kt
kt−1
− 1
)2
kt−1 (143)
ct =
(
cHt
)ν (
cFt
)1−ν
(ν)ν (1− ν)1−ν (144)
wt = mct(1− a)Atkat−1n−at (145)
1
TT 1−vt
rkt = mctaAtk
a−1
t−1 n
1−a
t (146)
ω˜t =
1
TT 1−vt
yHt −
1
TT 1−vt
rkt kt−1 − wtnt (147)
z1t =
φ
(φ− 1)z
2
t (148)
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yHt =
1
∆t
Atk
a
t−1n
1−a
t (149)
dt +mt =
Rt−1
Πt
λt−1dt−1 +
Qt−1TT v+v
∗−1
t
Π∗t
1
TT v+v
∗−1
t−1
(1− λt−1)dt−1+
+ 1Πtmt−1 + TT
ν−1
t s
g
t y
H
t − τ ct( 1TT 1−vt c
H
t + TT
v
t c
F
t )−
−τkt (rkt−1 1TT 1−vt kt−1 + ω˜t)− τ
n
t wtnt − TT ν−1t sltyHt
(150)
(1− λt)dt − TT ν∗+ν−1t fht + pit + TT ν−1t υt = −TT ν−1t cF∗t + TT νt cFt +
+
Qt−1TT ν
∗+ν−1
t
Π∗t
(
1
TT v+v
∗−1
t−1
(1− λt−1)dt−1 − fht−1
)
(151)
yHt = c
H
t + xt + s
g
t y
H
t + υt + c
F∗
t (152)(
ΠHt
)1−φ
= θ + (1− θ) (ΘtΠHt )1−φ (153)
Πt
ΠHt
=
(
TTt
TTt−1
)1−ν
(154)
TTt
TTt−1
=
tΠ
∗H
t
ΠHt
(155)
Π∗t
Π∗Ht
=
(
TTt−1
TTt
)1−ν∗
(156)
∆t = θ∆t−1
(
ΠHt
)φ
+ (1− θ) (Θt)−φ (157)
z1t = Θ
1−φ
t ytTT
ν−1
t + βθ
c−σt+1
c−σt
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
(
Θt
Θt+1
)1−φ( 1
ΠHt+1
)1−φ
z1t+1 (158)
z2t = Θ
−φ
t ytmct + βθ
c−σt+1
c−σt
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
(
Θt
Θt+1
)−φ( 1
ΠHt+1
)−φ
z2t+1 (159)
υt = Q
∗
t−1
ψ
2
PHt−1
PHt
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)2 (160)
pit = Q
∗
t−1
[
Pt−1
Pt
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)−
PHt
Pt
ψ
2
PHt−1
PHt
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)2
]
−Qt−1 St
St−1
Pt−1
Pt
(f∗gt−1 − f∗ht−1)
(161)
Q∗t−1 =
Qt−1 StSt−1
1− P
H
t−1
Pt−1ψ(f
∗g
t−1 − f∗ht−1)
(162)
Next, the foreign country is summarized by the following equations:
V ∗t =
c∗1−σ
∗
t
1− σ∗ − χ
∗
n
n∗1+ϕ
∗
t
1 + ϕ∗
+ χ∗m
m∗1−µ
∗
t
1− µ∗ + χ
∗
g
(
s∗gt y∗Ht
)1−ζ∗
1− ζ∗ + β
∗V ∗t+1 (163)
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β∗
c∗−σt+1(
1 + τ∗ct+1
) R∗t
Π∗t+1
=
c∗−σt
(1 + τ∗ct )
(164)
β∗
c∗−σt+1(
1 + τ∗ct+1
)Q∗tTT 1−ν−v∗t+1
Πt+1
=
c∗−σt
(1 + τ∗ct )
TT 1−ν−v
∗
t (165)
β∗TT 1−ν
∗
t+1
c
∗−σ
t+1
(1+τ∗ct+1)
{
1− δ∗ − ξ∗2
(
k∗t+1
k∗t
− 1
)2
+ ξ∗
(
k∗t+1
k∗t
− 1
)
k∗t+1
k∗t
+
(
1− τ∗kt+1
)
r∗kt+1
}
=
= TT 1−ν
∗
t
c∗−σt
(1+τ∗ct )
[
1 + ξ∗
(
k∗t
k∗t−1
− 1
)]
(166)
χ∗mm
∗−µ∗
t =
c∗−σt
(1 + τ∗ct )
− β∗ c
∗−σ
t+1(
1 + τ∗ct+1
) 1
Π∗t+1
(167)
χ∗nn
∗ϕ∗
t =
(
1− τ∗n∗t
)
w∗t
c∗−σt
(1 + τ∗ct )
(168)
c∗Ht
c∗Ft
=
ν∗
1− ν∗
1
TTt
(169)
k∗t = (1− δ∗)k∗t−1 + x∗t −
ξ∗
2
(
k∗t
k∗t−1
− 1
)2
k∗t−1 (170)
c∗t =
(
c∗Ht
)ν∗ (
c∗Ft
)1−ν∗
(ν∗)ν
∗
(1− ν∗)1−ν∗ (171)
w∗t = mc
∗
t (1− a∗)A∗tk∗a
∗
t−1n
∗−a∗
t (172)
TT 1−v
∗
t r
∗k
t = mc
∗
ta
∗A∗tk
∗a∗−1
t−1 n
∗1−a∗
t (173)
ω˜∗t = TT
1−v∗
t y
∗H
t − TT 1−v
∗
t r
∗k
t k
∗
t−1 − w∗t n∗t (174)
z∗1t =
φ∗
(φ∗ − 1)z
∗2
t (175)
y∗Ht =
1
∆∗t
A∗tk
∗a∗
t−1n
∗1−a∗
t (176)
d∗t +m∗t =
R∗t−1
Π∗t
λ∗t−1d∗t−1 +
Q∗t−1TT
1−v−v∗
t
Πt
1
TT 1−v−v
∗
t−1
(1− λ∗t−1)d∗t−1+
+ 1Π∗t
m∗t−1 + TT
1−ν∗
t s
∗g
t y
∗H
t − τ∗ct (TT 1−v
∗
t c
∗H
t +
1
TT v
∗
t
c∗Ft )−
−τ∗kt (r∗kt−1TT 1−v
∗
t k
∗
t−1 + ω˜
∗
t )− τ∗nt w∗t n∗t − s∗lt y∗Ht TT 1−ν
∗
t
(177)
y∗Ht = c
∗H
t + x
∗
t + s
∗g
t y
∗H
t + c
F
t (178)
(1− λ∗t )d∗t − TT 1−ν
∗−ν
t f
∗h
t = −TT 1−ν
∗
t c
F
t + TT
−ν∗
t c
F ∗
t
+
Q∗t−1TT
1−ν∗−ν
t
Πt
(
1
TT 1−v−v
∗
t−1
(1− λ∗t−1)d∗t−1 − fh
∗
t−1
)
(179)
(
Π∗Ht
)1−φ∗
= θ∗ + (1− θ∗) (Θ∗tΠ∗Ht )1−φ∗ (180)
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∆∗t = θ
∗∆∗t−1
(
Π∗Ht
)φ∗
+ (1− θ∗) (Θ∗t )−φ
∗
(181)
z∗1t = Θ
∗1−φ∗
t y
∗H
t TT
1−ν∗
t + β
∗θ∗
c∗−σ
∗
t+1
c∗−σ∗t
1 + τ∗ct
1 + τ∗ct+1
(
Θ∗t
Θ∗t+1
)1−φ∗ ( 1
Π∗Ht+1
)1−φ∗
z∗1t+1 (182)
z∗2t = Θ
∗−φ∗
t y
∗H
t mc
∗
t + β
∗θ∗
c∗−σ
∗
t+1
c∗−σ∗t
1 + τ∗ct
1 + τ∗ct+1
(
Θ∗t
Θ∗t+1
)−φ∗ ( 1
Π∗Ht+1
)−φ∗
z∗2t+1 (183)
where StF
g = (1− λt)Dt, F g = (1−λt)DtSt , F
g
P ∗t
= (1−λt)DtP ∗t St , f
g
t = (1− λt) dt PtP ∗t St = (1− λt) dt
1
TT ν
∗+ν−1
t
,
F ∗g
St
= (1− λ∗t )D∗t , F ∗g = (1− λt)D∗tSt, F
∗g
Pt
=
(1−λ∗t )D∗t St
Pt
, f∗gt = (1− λ∗t ) d∗t StP
∗
t
Pt
= (1− λ∗t ) d∗tTT ν
∗+ν−1
t ,
PHt−1
Pt−1 = TT
ν−1
t−1 ,
StP ∗t
Pt
= TT ν
∗+ν−1
t ,
Pt
StP ∗t
= TT 1−ν−v
∗
t+1 ,
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
=
(
P ∗Ht
P ∗Ft
)1−ν∗
, TTt =
PFt
PHt
=
PFt
St
PHt
St
=
P ∗Ht
P ∗Ft
,
P ∗Ft
P ∗Ht
= 1TTt , t =
St
St−1 .
We finally have the feedback monetary and fiscal policy rules:
log
(
Rt
R
)
= φpi
(
η log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ (1− η) log
(
Π∗t
Π∗
))
+
+φy
(
η log
(
yHt
yH
)
+ (1− η) log
(
y∗Ht
y∗H
))
(184)
sgt − sg = −γgl (lt−1 − l)− γgy
(
yHt − yH
)
(185)
slt − sl = γll (lt−1 − l) + γly
(
yHt − yH
)
(186)
τ ct − τ c = γcl (lt−1 − l) + γcy
(
yHt − yH
)
(187)
τkt − τk = γkl (lt−1 − l) + γky
(
yHt − yH
)
(188)
τnt − τn = γnl (lt−1 − l) + γny
(
yHt − yH
)
(189)
s∗gt − s∗g = −γ∗gl
(
l∗t−1 − l∗
)− γ∗gy (y∗Ht − y∗H) (190)
s∗lt − s∗l = γ∗ll
(
l∗t−1 − l∗
)
+ γ∗ly
(
y∗Ht − y∗H
)
(191)
τ∗ct − τ∗c = γ∗cl
(
l∗t−1 − l∗
)
+ γ∗cy
(
y∗Ht − y∗H
)
(192)
τ∗kt − τ∗k = γ∗kl
(
l∗t−1 − l∗
)
+ γ∗ky
(
y∗Ht − y∗H
)
(193)
τ∗nt − τ∗n = γ∗nl
(
l∗t−1 − l∗
)
+ γ∗ny
(
y∗Ht − y∗H
)
(194)
lt =
Rtλtdt +Qtt+1 (1− λt) dt
TT ν−1t yHt
(195)
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l∗t =
R∗tλ
∗
td
∗
t +Q
∗
t
1
t+1
(1− λ∗t ) d∗t
TT 1−ν∗t y∗Ht
(196)
Therefore, we have 61 equations in total. We also have 61 endogenous variables, which
are {V, yH , c, cH , cF , n, x, k, fh, m, TT, Π, ΠH , Θ, ∆, w, mc, ω˜, rk, d, Π∗, z1, z2, Q, pi,
q} and {R, sg, sl, τ c, τk, τn, l} for the home country, and {V ∗, y∗H , c∗, c∗H , c∗F , n∗, x∗, k∗,
f∗h, m∗, Π∗H , Θ∗, ∆∗, w∗, mc∗, ω˜∗, r∗k, d∗, z∗1, z∗2, Q∗, R∗} and {s∗g, s∗l, τ∗c, τ∗k, τ∗n, l∗}
for the foreign country. This is given given the exogenous variables, {, λ, λ∗, A, A∗}, initial
conditions for the state variables and the values of the feedback (monetary and fiscal) policy
coefficients in the policy rules.
Notice that, since all market-clearing conditions have been already included, the above
system also satisfies the international asset market-clearing condition, (f∗g − f∗h) + StP ∗tPt (fg −
fh) = 0. This can be seen if we add up the two balance of payments above; this will give
(f∗g − f∗h) + StP ∗tPt (fg − fh) = 0 residually.
Notice also that net exports are exports minus imports. Thus, net exports of Germany
as share of GDP are NEt ≡ P
H
t c
F∗
t −PFt cFt
PHt y
H
t
=
cF∗t −TTtcFt
yHt
, while net exports of Italy as share
of GDP and denominated in domestic currency are NE∗t ≡ StP
∗H
t c
F
t −PHt c∗Ft
StP ∗Ht y∗Ht
=
PFt c
F
t −PHt c∗Ft
PFt y
∗H
t
=
cFt − 1TTt c
∗F
t
y∗Ht
.
13.5 Steady state and transition
The steady state system follows directly from the above defined system when variables do not
change over time. At steady state, we set Π = Π∗ = 1 and let the nominal interest rates
to follow residually from the Euler for bonds in each country. Regarding fiscal policy, the
residual policy instrument is total public debt in each country. To get the transition path, we
approximate the dynamic system around its steady state solution, as explained in the main
text (see section 4).
14 Appendix 6: Equilibrium in the reformed economy
We study two cases as said in the main text.
14.1 When premia are allowed in the new reformed steady state
The equilibrium system in the reformed economy is the same as above (see the system of 61
equations above) except that now, in Italy, the debt target in the feedback policy rules in
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subsection 2.6.2 is set at 0.9. In the steady state of this reformed economy, with d
∗
TT 1−ν∗y∗H
set at 0.9, the capital tax rate falls to 0.302. Table A.1 reports the associated steady state
solution.
Table A1: Reformed steady state with debt consolidation in Italy (with premia)
Variables Description Home Foreign
u, u∗ utility 0.0397 0.0337
yH , yH∗ output 0.3912 0.3569
c, c∗ consumption 0.2319 0.2283
n, n∗ hours worked 0.3116 0.3067
k, k∗ capital 0.6654 0.508
w, w∗ real wage rate 0.6904 0.7111
rk, rk∗ real return to capital 0.147 0.1756
TT terms-of-trade 1.098
Q∗ −Q interest rate premium 0.0055
c
yHTT 1−ν ,
c∗
yH∗TT ν
∗−1
t
consumption as
share of GDP
0.5656 0.6704
k
yH
, k
∗
yH∗ capital as share of GDP 1.7 1.4236
d
TT ν−1yH ,
d∗
TT 1−ν∗y∗H
total public debt
as share of GDP
0.69 0.9
(
(1−λ)d
TTν−1−TT
ν∗
t f
h
)
yH
,
(1−λ∗)d∗
TT1−ν−ν∗ −f
∗h
TT νt y
∗H
total foreign debt
as share of GDP*
-0.21 0.209
14.2 When premia are not allowed in the new reformed steady state
The equilibrium system in the reformed economy is the same as above (see the system of 61
equations above) except that now, in Italy, not only the debt target in the feedback policy
rules in subsection 2.6.2 is set at 0.9, but also the discount factor, β∗, follows the AR(1) rule:
β∗t = ρ
β∗β∗t−1 +
(
1− ρβ∗
)
β (197)
where variables’ definitions are in the main text and, as said, the value of ρβ
∗
is chosen
optimally.
In the steady state of this reformed economy: (a) In Italy, since the public debt-to-GDP
ratio is set at an exogenously given value, one of the other fiscal variables becomes endogenous.
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As said, we report results when it is the capital tax rate that plays that role. (b) Sovereign
premia are eliminated by setting Q∗ = Q. This, in turn, implies β∗ = β via the Euler equations
for the international asset in the two countries written at the steady state. It also implies that
that we lose one equation (the two Euler equations for the international asset become identical),
but, at the same time, in order to have Q∗ = Q, we also have a new equation, f∗g − f∗h = 0,
so the steady state system remains well defined in terms of equations and unknowns. The
associated steady state solution is in Table A2.
Table A2: Reformed steady state with debt consolidation in Italy (without premia)
Variables Description Home Foreign
u, u∗ utility 0.0403 0.054
yH , yH∗ output 0.3925 0.367
c, c∗ consumption 0.23 0.23
n, n∗ hours worked 0.31 0.307
k, k∗ capital 0.667 0.556
w, w∗ real wage rate 0.70 0.7259
rk, rk∗ real return to capital 0.147 0.1653
TT terms-of-trade 1.086 -
Q∗ −Q interest rate premium - 0
c
yHTT 1−ν ,
c∗
yH∗TT ν
∗−1
t
consumption as
share of GDP
0.5678 0.6588
k
yH
, k
∗
yH∗ capital as share of GDP 1.7009 1.5123
d
TT ν−1yH ,
d∗
TT 1−ν∗y∗H
total public debt
as share of GDP
0.6433 0.9
(
(1−λ)d
TTν−1−TT
ν∗
t f
h
)
yH
,
(1−λ∗)d∗
TT1−ν−ν∗ −f
∗h
TT νt y
∗H
total foreign debt
as share of GDP*
0 0
15 Appendix 7: Response functions under other policy scenar-
ios
In this Appendix, we present the response functions in three more cases.
15.1 Adding TFP shocks to Figures 1-3
In Figures 1-3 in the main text, transition dynamics was driven by deterministic policy reforms
in Italy only. Here, we enrich these figures by adding a temporary adverse shock to TFP in
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Italy. The red and blue lines show the same policy scenarios as in Figures 1-3, while now
the green lines show the case in which policy is optimally chosen in both countries but Italy
does not reduce its debt in the new steady state (that is, in this scenario, we start from and
end up at the same status quo steady state solution and deviations from this solution are
produced by temporary shocks). Recall that this non-consolidation scenario was described in
subsection 4.2 and has served as benchmark for the computation of welfare differences in terms
of consumption equivalents.
Figure F1: Response functions of public debt to GDP and fiscal instruments in Italy
(in levels)
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Figure F2: Response functions of main macro variables in Germany and Italy
(in percentage deviations from status-quo steady state)
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Figure F3: Response functions of main price indices in Germany and Italy (in levels)
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15.2 Fiscal consolidation without premia in the new reformed steady
Figures 1-3 in the text have allowed for premia in the new reformed steady state (see subsection
5.1.1). We now present the response functions in the more ambitious case in which, not only
public debt is reduced, but also premia are eliminated, in the new reformed steady state (see
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subsection 5.1.2 for this scenario). Since the responses of policy instruments and prices remain
qualitatively the same as in Figures 1 and 3 respectively, here we just present the simulated
paths of the main macro variables. This is in Figure F4 which should be compared to Figure
2 in the text.
Figure F4: Response functions of main macro variables in Germany and Italy
without premia in the reformed steady state
(in percentage deviations from status-quo steady state)
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15.3 Fiscal consolidation via ad hoc cuts in transfers
Here, we present the response functions in the case in which debt consolidation would take
place via ad hoc cuts in transfers (see the blue lines). For comparison, we include the same
response functions in the case in which debt consolidation takes place via optimal cuts in
government consumpion spending as in Figures 1-3 in the main text (see the red lines). Thus,
Figures F5-F7 should be compared to Figures 1-3 in the text.
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Figure F5: Response functions of public debt to GDP and fiscal instruments in Italy
with ad hoc cuts in transfers (in levels)
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Figure F6: Response functions of main macro variables in Germany and Italy
with ad hoc cuts in transfer (in percentage deviations from status-quo steady state)
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Figure F7: Response functions of main price indices in Germany and Italy
with ad hoc cuts in transfer (in levels)
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16 Appendix 8: Adding non-Ricardian agents and public in-
vestment
In this Appendix, we add non-Ricardian households and productivity-enhancing public spend-
ing. To save on space, we add both model extensions at the same time by building upon the
model developed in section 2 in the main text (although, in the numerical solutions, we report
results for one extension at a time).
16.1 Adding non-Ricardian households
In each country, instead of having i = 1, 2, ..., N identical households as assumed so far, there
are Nr Ricardian houselholds who behave as the households i modelled above (these households
are now denoted by the subscript r = 1, 2, ..., Nr) and Nnr non-Ricardian households, where
Nnr = N −Nr, who do not participate in financial and capital markets (these new households
are denoted by the subscript nr = 1, 2, ..., Nnr). Their corresponding population shares are νr
and νnr = 1 − νr. We assume that, in each country, the number of private firms equals the
number of Ricardian households (this is for simplicity).
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The constraints of each non-Ricardian household are as in equations (1)-(6) in the main
text while its budget constraint is a simplified version of equation (9), namely:
(1 + τ ct)
[
PHt
Pt
cHnr,t +
PFt
Pt
cFnr,t
]
+mnr,t =
= (1− τnt )wtnnr,t + Pt−1Pt mnr,t−1 − τ li,t
(198)
that is, this new household does not save in physical capital, government bonds or international
assets and does not get any profits distributed by firms.
The objective function is like equations (7)-(8) in the main text. The optimality conditions
of the new agent, as well as the full new equilbrium system, are presented in detail below.
16.2 Adding government investment
Now, the firm’s production function changes from equation (13) in the main text to:
yHt (h) = At(g
i
t)
κ[kt−1(h)]α[nt(h)]1−α (199)
where git is the per capita quantity of productivity-enhancing public goods/services and 0 ≤
κ ≤ 1 is a technology parameter. Notice that, as in Baxter and King (1993), we keep the
assumption of CRS over private inputs.
In equilibrium, git = s
i
ty
H
t , in other words, public investment is a share of output and this
share is set as in the data. We thus have a new fiscal policy instrument, sit, which is allowed
to follow (like the other policy instruments) the feedback rule:
sit − si = −γil (lt−1 − l)− γiy
(
yHt − yH
)
(200)
and similalry in the foreign country:
s∗it − s∗i = −γ∗il
(
l∗t−1 − l∗
)− γ∗il (y∗Ht − y∗H) (201)
where γil, γ
i
y, γ
∗i
l , γ
∗i
l ≥ 0 are feedback policy coefficients like those in equations 18-21 in the
main text.
The full new equilbrium system is presented in detail in what follows.
16.3 The extended final equilibrium system in the status quo economy
Given the above extensions, the domestic country is summarized by the equation system pre-
sented in detail below. Notice that this system includes government investment, non-Ricardian
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agents and rules for all main fiscal policy instruments in both countries. We also allow for differ-
ent transfers between Ricardian and non-Ricardian households in each country. In particular,
if slt is total transfers as share of GDP as above, then a fraction 0 ≤ % ≤ 1 of this goes to
non-Ricardian households and the rest goes to Ricardian households and this happens in both
countries (we have experimented with different values of %).
Ricardian households:
Vr,t =
(cr,t)
1−σ
1− σ − χn
(nr,t)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ χm
(mr,t)
1−µ
1− µ + χg
(
sgt y
H
t
)1−ζ
1− ζ + βVr,t+1 (202)
β
(cr,t+1)
−σ(
1 + τ ct+1
) Rt
Πt+1
=
(cr,t)
−σ
(1 + τ ct)
(203)
β
(cr,t+1)
−σ(
1 + τ ct+1
)QtTT v∗+ν−1t+1
Π∗t+1
=
(cr,t)
−σ
(1 + τ ct)
TT v
∗+ν−1
t (204)
β
(cr,t+1)−σ
(1+τct+1)
TT ν−1t+1
{
1− δ − ξ2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
+ ξ
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)
kt+1
kt
+
(
1− τkt+1
)
rkt+1
}
=
=
(cr,t)−σ
(1+τct )
TT ν−1t
[
1 + ξ
(
kt
kt−1 − 1
)] (205)
χm(mr,t)
−µ =
(cr,t)
−σ
(1 + τ ct)
− β (cr,t+1)
−σ(
1 + τ ct+1
) 1
Πt+1
(206)
χn(nr,t)
ϕ = (1− τnt )wt
(cr,t)
−σ
(1 + τ ct)
(207)
cHr,t
cFr,t
=
ν
1− ν TTt (208)
kr,t = (1− δ)kr,t−1 + xr,t − ξ
2
(
kr,t
kr,t−1
− 1
)2
kr,t−1 (209)
cr,t =
(
cHr,t
)ν (
cFr,t
)1−ν
(ν)ν (1− ν)1−ν (210)
Non-Ricardian households (in the new system, we have the 6 new equations right below
and 6 new endogenous variables, cHnr,t, c
F
nr,t, cnr,t, nnr,t, mnr,t, Vnr,t):
(1 + τ ct)
[
PHt
Pt
cHnr,t +
PFt
Pt
cFnr,t
]
+mnr,t =
= (1− τnt )wtnnr,t + Pt−1Pt mnr,t−1 − TT ν−1t sltyHt
%
νnr
(211)
Vnr,t =
(cnr,t)
1−σ
1− σ − χn
(nnr,t)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ χm
(mnr,t)
1−µ
1− µ + χg
(
sgt y
H
t
)1−ζ
1− ζ + βVnr,t+1 (212)
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χn(nnr,t)
ϕ = (1− τnt )wt
(cnr,t)
−σ
(1 + τ ct)
(213)
χm(mnr,t)
−µ =
(cnr,t)
−σ
(1 + τ ct)
− β (cnr,t+1)
−σ(
1 + τ ct+1
) 1
Πt+1
(214)
cHnr,t
cFnr,t
=
ν
1− ν TTt (215)
cnr,t =
(
cHnr,t
)ν (
cFnr,t
)1−ν
(ν)ν (1− ν)1−ν (216)
Firms:
wt = mct(1− a)At(sityHt )κ(νrkr,t−1)α(νrnr,t + νnrnnr,t)−a (217)
1
TT 1−vt
rkt = mctaAt(s
i
ty
H
t )
κ(νrkr,t−1)α−1(νrnr,t + νnrnnr,t)1−a (218)
ω˜r,t =
1
TT 1−vt
yHt −
1
TT 1−vt
rkt νrkr,t−1 − wt(νrnr,t + νnrnnr,t) (219)
yHt =
1
∆t
At(s
i
ty
H
t )
κ(νrkr,t−1)α(νrnr,t + νnrnnr,t)1−a (220)
z1t =
φ
(φ− 1)z
2
t (221)
Constraints:
dt + (νrmr,t + νnrmrn,t) =
Rt−1
Πt
λt−1dt−1 +
Qt−1TT v+v
∗−1
t
Π∗t
1
TT v+v
∗−1
t−1
(1− λt−1)dt−1+
+ 1Πt (νrmr,t−1 + νnrmrn,t−1) + TT
ν−1
t (s
g
t + s
i
t)y
H
t −
−τ ct [ 1TT 1−vt (νrc
H
r,t + νnrc
H
nr,t) + TT
v
t (νrc
F
r,t + νnrc
F
nr,t)]−
−τkt νr(rkt−1 1TT 1−vt kr,t−1 + ω˜r,t)− τ
n
t wt(νrnr,t + νnrnnr,t)− TT ν−1t sltyHt
(222)
(1− λt)dt − TT ν∗+ν−1t νrfht + νrpit + TT ν−1t υt = −TT ν−1t (νrcF∗r,t + νnrcF∗nr,t)+
+TT νt (νrc
F
r,t + νnrc
F
nr,t)+
+
Qt−1TT ν
∗+ν−1
t
Π∗t
(
1
TT v+v
∗−1
t−1
(1− λt−1)dt−1 − νrfht−1
) (223)
yHt = (νrc
H
r,t + νnrc
H
nr,t) + νrxr,t + (s
g
t + s
i
t)y
H
t + υt + (νrc
F∗
r,t + νnrc
F∗
nr,t) (224)
Prices:
88
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
(
ΠHt
)1−φ
= θ + (1− θ) (ΘtΠHt )1−φ (225)
Πt
ΠHt
=
(
TTt
TTt−1
)1−ν
(226)
TTt
TTt−1
=
tΠ
∗H
t
ΠHt
(227)
Π∗t
Π∗Ht
=
(
TTt−1
TTt
)1−ν∗
(228)
∆t = θ∆t−1
(
ΠHt
)φ
+ (1− θ) (Θt)−φ (229)
z1t = Θ
1−φ
t y
H
t TT
ν−1
t + βθ
c−σt+1
c−σt
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
(
Θt
Θt+1
)1−φ( 1
ΠHt+1
)1−φ
z1t+1 (230)
z2t = Θ
−φ
t y
H
t mct + βθ
c−σt+1
c−σt
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
(
Θt
Θt+1
)−φ( 1
ΠHt+1
)−φ
z2t+1 (231)
Financial intermediary:
υt = Q
∗
t−1
ψ
2
PHt−1
PHt
(f∗gt−1 − νrf∗ht−1)2 (232)
pit = Q
∗
t−1
[
Pt−1
Pt
(f∗gt−1 − νrf∗ht−1)−
PHt
Pt
ψ
2
PHt−1
PHt
(f∗gt−1 − νrf∗ht−1)2
]
−Qt−1 St
St−1
Pt−1
Pt
(f∗gt−1−νrf∗ht−1)
(233)
Q∗t−1 =
Qt−1 StSt−1
1− P
H
t−1
Pt−1ψ(f
∗g
t−1 − νrf∗ht−1)
(234)
Next, the foreign country is summarized by the following equations:
Ricardian households:
V ∗r,t =
c∗1−σ
∗
r,t
1− σ∗ − χ
∗
n
n∗1+ϕ
∗
r,t
1 + ϕ∗
+ χ∗m
m∗1−µ
∗
r,t
1− µ∗ + χ
∗
g
(
s∗gt y∗Ht
)1−ζ∗
1− ζ∗ + β
∗V ∗r,t+1 (235)
β∗
c∗−σr,t+1(
1 + τ∗ct+1
) R∗t
Π∗t+1
=
c∗−σr,t
(1 + τ∗ct )
(236)
β∗
c∗−σr,t+1(
1 + τ∗ct+1
)Q∗tTT 1−ν−v∗t+1
Πt+1
=
c∗−σr,t
(1 + τ∗ct )
TT 1−ν−v
∗
t (237)
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βTT 1−ν
∗
t+1
c
∗−σ
r,t+1
(1+τ∗ct+1)
{
1− δ∗ − ξ∗2
(
k∗t+1
k∗t
− 1
)2
+ ξ∗
(
k∗t+1
k∗t
− 1
)
k∗t+1
k∗t
+
(
1− τ∗kt+1
)
r∗kt+1
}
= TT 1−ν
∗
t
c∗−σr,t
(1+τ∗ct )
[
1 + ξ∗
(
k∗t
k∗t−1
− 1
)] (238)
χ∗mm
∗−µ∗
r,t =
c∗−σr,t
(1 + τ∗ct )
− β∗ c
∗−σ
r,t+1(
1 + τ∗ct+1
) 1
Π∗t+1
(239)
χ∗nn
∗ϕ∗
r,t =
(
1− τ∗n∗t
)
w∗t
c∗−σr,t
(1 + τ∗ct )
(240)
c∗Hr,t
c∗Fr,t
=
ν∗
1− ν∗
1
TTt
(241)
k∗r,t = (1− δ∗)k∗r,t−1 + x∗r,t −
ξ∗
2
(
k∗r,t
k∗r,t−1
− 1
)2
k∗r,t−1 (242)
c∗r,t =
(
c∗Hr,t
)ν∗ (
c∗Fr,t
)1−ν∗
(ν∗)ν
∗
(1− ν∗)1−ν∗ (243)
Non-Ricardian households:
(1 + τ c∗t )
[
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
c∗Hnr,t +
P ∗Ft
P ∗t
c∗Fnr,t
]
+m∗nr,t =
= (1− τn∗t )w∗t n∗nr,t + P
∗
t−1
P ∗t
m∗nr,t−1 − TT 1−ν
∗
t s
∗l
t y
∗H
t
%∗
ν∗nr
(244)
V ∗nr,t =
c∗1−σ
∗
nr,t
1− σ∗ − χ
∗
n
n∗1+ϕ
∗
nr,t
1 + ϕ∗
+ χ∗m
m∗1−µ
∗
nr,t
1− µ∗ + χ
∗
g
(
s∗gt y∗Ht
)1−ζ∗
1− ζ∗ + β
∗V ∗nr,t+1 (245)
χ∗n(n
∗
nr,t)
ϕ∗ = (1− τ∗nt )w∗t
(c∗nr,t)−σ∗
(1 + τ c∗t )
(246)
χ∗m(m
∗
nr,t)
−µ∗ =
(c∗nr,t)−σ
(1 + τ c∗t )
− β (c
∗
nr,t+1)
−σ∗(
1 + τ c∗t+1
) 1
Π∗t+1
(247)
c∗Hnr,t
c∗Fnr,t
=
ν∗
1− ν∗
1
TT t
(248)
c∗nr,t =
(
c∗Hnr,t
)ν∗ (
c∗Fnr,t
)1−ν∗
(ν∗)ν
∗
(1− ν∗)1−ν∗ (249)
Firms:
w∗t = mc
∗
t (1− a∗)A∗t (s∗it y∗Ht )κ
(
ν∗rk
∗
r,t−1
)a∗ (
ν∗rn
∗
r,t + ν
∗
nrn
∗
nr,t
)−a∗
(250)
TT 1−v
∗
t r
∗k
t = mc
∗
ta
∗A∗t (s
∗i
t y
∗H
t )
κ (ν∗rk∗r,t−1)a∗−1 (ν∗rn∗r,t + ν∗nrn∗nr,t)1−a∗ (251)
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ω˜∗t = TT
1−v∗
t y
∗H
t − TT 1−v
∗
t r
∗k
t ν
∗
rk
∗
r,t−1 − w∗t
(
ν∗rn
∗
r,t + ν
∗
nrn
∗
nr,t
)
(252)
y∗Ht =
1
∆∗t
At(s
∗i
t y
∗H
t )
κ (ν∗rk∗r,t−1)a∗ (ν∗rn∗r,t + ν∗nrn∗nr,t)1−a∗ (253)
z∗1t =
φ∗
(φ∗ − 1)z
∗2
t (254)
Constraints:
d∗t + ν∗rm∗r,t + ν∗nrm∗nr,t =
R∗t−1
Π∗t
λ∗t−1d∗t−1 +
Q∗t−1TT
1−v−v∗
t
Πt
1
TT 1−v−v
∗
t−1
(1− λ∗t−1)d∗t−1+
+ 1Π∗t
(
ν∗rm∗r,t−1 + ν∗nrm∗nr,t−1
)
+ TT 1−ν
∗
t (s
∗g
t + s
∗i
t )y
∗H
t −
−τ∗ct ν∗nr(TT 1−v
∗
t c
∗H
nr,t +
1
TT v
∗
t
c∗Fnr,t)− τ∗ct ν∗r(TT 1−v
∗
t c
∗H
r,t +
1
TT v
∗
t
c∗Fr,t )−
−τ∗kt ν∗r(r∗kt−1TT 1−v
∗
t k
∗
r,t−1 + ω˜
∗
r,t)− τ∗nt w∗t
(
ν∗rn∗r,t + ν∗nrn∗nr,t
)− s∗lt y∗Ht TT 1−ν∗t
(255)
(1− λ∗t )d∗t − TT 1−ν
∗−ν
t ν
∗
rf
∗h
t = −TT 1−ν
∗
t
(
ν∗rcFr,t + ν∗nrcFnr,t
)
+
+TT−ν
∗
t
(
ν∗rcF
∗
r,t + ν
∗
nrc
F ∗
nr,t
)
+
Q∗t−1TT
1−ν∗−ν
t
Πt
(
1
TT 1−v−v
∗
t−1
(1− λ∗t−1)d∗t−1 − ν∗rfh
∗
t−1
) (256)
y∗Ht = ν
∗
rc
∗H
r,t + ν
∗
nrc
∗H
nr,t + ν
∗
rx
∗
r,t + (s
∗g
t + s
∗i
t )y
∗H
t + ν
∗
rc
F
r,t + ν
∗
nrc
F
nr,t (257)
Prices:
(
Π∗Ht
)1−φ∗
= θ∗ + (1− θ∗) (Θ∗tΠ∗Ht )1−φ∗ (258)
∆∗t = θ
∗∆∗t−1
(
Π∗Ht
)φ∗
+ (1− θ∗) (Θ∗t )−φ
∗
(259)
z∗1t = Θ
∗1−φ∗
t y
∗H
t TT
1−ν∗
t + β
∗θ∗
c∗−σ
∗
t+1
c∗−σ∗t
1 + τ∗ct
1 + τ∗ct+1
(
Θ∗t
Θ∗t+1
)1−φ∗ ( 1
Π∗Ht+1
)1−φ∗
z∗1t+1 (260)
z∗2t = Θ
∗−φ∗
t y
∗H
t mc
∗
t + β
∗θ∗
c∗−σ
∗
t+1
c∗−σ∗t
1 + τ∗ct
1 + τ∗ct+1
(
Θ∗t
Θ∗t+1
)−φ∗ ( 1
Π∗Ht+1
)−φ∗
z∗2t+1 (261)
where we have used StF
g = (1− λt)Dt, F g = (1−λt)DtSt , F
g
P ∗t
= (1−λt)DtP ∗t St , f
g
t = (1− λt) dt PtP ∗t St =
(1− λt) dt 1
TT ν
∗+ν−1
t
, F
∗g
St
= (1− λ∗t )D∗t , F ∗g = (1− λt)D∗tSt, F
∗g
Pt
=
(1−λ∗t )D∗t St
Pt
, f∗gt = (1− λ∗t ) d∗t StP
∗
t
Pt
=
(1− λ∗t ) d∗tTT ν
∗+ν−1
t ,
PHt−1
Pt−1 = TT
ν−1
t−1 ,
StP ∗t
Pt
= TT ν
∗+ν−1
t ,
Pt
StP ∗t
= TT 1−ν−v
∗
t+1 ,
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
=
(
P ∗Ht
P ∗Ft
)1−ν∗
,
TTt =
PFt
PHt
=
PFt
St
PHt
St
=
P ∗Ht
P ∗Ft
,
P ∗Ft
P ∗Ht
= 1TTt , t =
St
St−1 .
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We finally have the feedback policy rules:
log
(
Rt
R
)
= φpi
(
η log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ (1− η) log
(
Π∗t
Π∗
))
+
+φy
(
η log
(
yHt
yH
)
+ (1− η) log
(
y∗Ht
y∗H
))
(262)
sgt − sg = −γgl (lt−1 − l)− γgy
(
yHt − yH
)
(263)
sit − si = −γil (lt−1 − l)− γiy
(
yHt − yH
)
(264)
slt − sl = γll (lt−1 − l) + γly
(
yHt − yH
)
(265)
τ ct − τ c = γcl (lt−1 − l) + γcy
(
yHt − yH
)
(266)
τkt − τk = γkl (lt−1 − l) + γky
(
yHt − yH
)
(267)
τnt − τn = γnl (lt−1 − l) + γny
(
yHt − yH
)
(268)
s∗gt − s∗g = −γ∗gl
(
l∗t−1 − l∗
)− γ∗gy (y∗Ht − y∗H) (269)
s∗it − s∗i = −γ∗il
(
l∗t−1 − l∗
)− γ∗iy (y∗Ht − y∗H) (270)
s∗lt − s∗l = γ∗ll
(
l∗t−1 − l∗
)
+ γ∗ly
(
y∗Ht − y∗H
)
(271)
τ∗ct − τ∗c = γ∗cl
(
l∗t−1 − l∗
)
+ γ∗cy
(
y∗Ht − y∗H
)
(272)
τ∗kt − τ∗k = γ∗kl
(
l∗t−1 − l∗
)
+ γ∗ky
(
y∗Ht − y∗H
)
(273)
τ∗nt − τ∗n = γ∗nl
(
l∗t−1 − l∗
)
+ γ∗ny
(
y∗Ht − y∗H
)
(274)
lt =
Rtλtdt +Qtt+1 (1− λt) dt
TT ν−1t yHt
(275)
l∗t =
R∗tλ
∗
td
∗
t +Q
∗
t
1
t+1
(1− λ∗t ) d∗t
TT 1−ν∗t y∗Ht
(276)
Welfare functions:
Home weighted average:
Vt ≡ νrVr,t + (1− νr)Vnr,t (277)
Foreign weighted average:
V ∗t ≡ ν∗rV ∗r,t + (1− ν∗r)V ∗nr,t (278)
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World weighted average:
Wt = ηVt + (1− η)V ∗t (279)
16.4 Steady state solution with non-Ricardian households
Table A3: Status quo steady state solution with non-Ricardian agents
Variables Description Home Foreign
ur, u
∗
r utility Ricardian 0.2918 0.2893
unr, u
∗
nr utility non-Ricardian 0.0115 -0.0032
yH , yH∗ output 0.3975 0.3603
cr, c
∗
r consumption Ricardian 0.2767 0.2735
cnr, c
∗
nr consumption non-Ricardian 0.1937 0.1896
Q∗−Q interest rate premium - 0.0055
d
TT ν−1yH ,
d∗
TT 1−ν∗y∗H
total public debt
as share of GDP
0.6842 1.08
(
(1−λ)d
TTν−1−TT
ν∗
t f
h
)
yH
,
(1−λ∗)d∗
TT1−ν−ν∗ −f
∗h
TT νt y
∗H
total foreign debt
as share of GDP*
-0.2274 0.2107
Notes: Parameters and policy variables as in Tables 1a-b and as discussed in the text.
17 Appendix 9: Flexible exchange rates
In this appendix, we present response functions for some key variables in the case of indepen-
dent monetary policies meaning flexible exchange rates. As discussed in the text, the range of
feedback monetary policy coefficients is restricted so as, in equilibrium, nominal interest rates
do not violate their ZLB. Below, we present the response functions in a currency union (red
solid lines) and under flexible exchange rates (brown dashed lines). For reasons of comparison
with Figures 2 and 3 in the text, we focus on the case in which premia remain in the new
reformed steady state.
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Figure F8: Response functions of main macro variables in Germany and Italy
under flexible exchange rates (in percentage deviations from status-quo steady state)
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Figure F9: Response functions of main price indices in Germany and Italy
under flexible exchange rates (in levels)
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